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This thesis is an exploration of two questions that are neither novel nor lacking in 
exploration: Is an International Environmental Court (IEC) needed? Is such a court 
feasible? Proposals for an IEC have a rich history, are well founded and numerous. On the 
issue of necessity, this thesis attempts to pull together historical and current information 
on two distinct areas of international environmental law and use these analyses to 
contextualize the need for an international environmental tribunal. Arguments for and 
against an IEC are presented within a discussion of environmental diplomacy. 
 
This thesis begins with a legal discussion of potential climate change actions in current 
international fora. This section is an attempt to add a layer of context on what the 
international legal landscape looks like for environmental actions while presenting one of 
two broad areas of environmental redress: a civil action. The analysis then moves on to 
discuss an international cause of action debated and advocated for over the past half 
century: ecocide. The need for a singular cause of action to fit the particularities of 
intentional environmental harm inflicted upon peoples is used to present the second broad 
area of environmental redress necessitated by international affairs: a criminal action. The 
analysis then moves from necessity to feasibility, beginning with an overview of 
proposals for an international agreement to create an environmental tribunal adequate to 
address the needs presented in the preceding sections.  
 
This analysis draws on international relations theory in its conclusion that such a tribunal 
is necessary and potential, dependent on legally cognizable factors working in tandem 
with considerable advocacy. The belief that the potentially catastrophic human ability to 
affect the global environment has existed at least since the reality of nuclear holocaust 
threatened during the Cold War, is currently at issue in relation to climate change, and is 
likely to be an ongoing reality in a quickly developing, technologically hyper-driven, 
globally interconnected, resource-scarce future underpins this analysis. The need to have 
international legal mechanisms to protect those at the fringes of these processes who are 
often the most harmed by environmental degradation lends urgency to the project of 
investigating the feasibility of creating an IEC tasked with ruling on agreed international 
environmental norms and rights. 
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Chapter One: Necessity and Feasibility 
 
This thesis is an exploration of two questions that are neither novel nor lacking in 
exploration: Is an International Environmental Court (IEC) needed? Is such a court 
feasible? Proposals for an IEC have a rich history, are well founded and numerous. On the 
issue of necessity, this thesis attempts to pull together historical and current information 
on two distinct areas of international environmental law and use these analyses to 
contextualize the need for an international environmental tribunal. Arguments for and 
against an IEC are presented within a discussion of environmental diplomacy. 
This thesis begins with a legal discussion of potential climate change actions in 
current international fora. This section is an attempt to add a layer of context on what the 
international legal landscape looks like for environmental actions while presenting one of 
two broad areas of environmental redress: a civil action. The analysis then moves on to 
discuss an international cause of action debated and advocated for over the past half 
century: ecocide. The need for a singular cause of action to fit the particularities of 
intentional environmental harm inflicted upon peoples is used to present the second broad 
area of environmental redress necessitated by international affairs: a criminal action. The 
analysis then moves from necessity to feasibility, beginning with an overview of 
proposals for an international agreement to create an environmental tribunal adequate to 
address the needs presented in the preceding sections.  
This analysis draws on international relations theory in its conclusion that such a 
tribunal is necessary and potential, dependent on legally cognizable factors working in 
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tandem with considerable advocacy. The belief that the potentially catastrophic human 
ability to affect the global environment has existed at least since the reality of nuclear 
holocaust threatened during the Cold War, is currently at issue in relation to climate 
change, and is likely to be an ongoing reality in a quickly developing, technologically 
hyper-driven, globally interconnected, resource-scarce future underpins this analysis. The 
need to have international legal mechanisms to protect those at the fringes of these 
processes who are often the most harmed by environmental degradation makes the project 
of investigating the feasibility of creating an IEC tasked with ruling on agreed international 
environmental norms and rights. 
Causes of Action and Theories of Justice 
 
The following analysis simplistically breaks down the legal terrain into two 
distinct areas of law: civil and criminal. A perspective on justice that incorporates three 
theoretical concepts reinforces the following analysis. These three types of justice flow 
throughout the discussion below and guide the analysis of proposals for modulating the 
international system to serve the needs of those who suffer grave harms: 
- Retributive Justice: concerns the ethical appropriateness of punishment 
for wrongdoing. It encompasses both backward-looking (retaliation) and 
forward-looking (deterrence) elements. This is the so-called “criminal 
justice.” 
- Corrective Justice: concerns the ethical appropriateness of rectifying 
imbalances in benefits and burdens caused by a loss or a gain. This is the 
so-called “civil justice.” 
- Distributive Justice: concerns the ethical appropriateness of redistributing 
goods and benefits (for example, wealth, power, reward, or respect) 
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between actors who are not in equal situations at the start. This is the so-
called “social justice.1 
 
It is not the aim here to argue that the international system should embody the perfection 
of these facets of justice, but only to keep them in mind throughout the discussion and 
relate current and potential institutional capacity to the goal of justice in its multiple 
dimensions. 
“Civil law” here is meant to cover actions attempting to recover damages for harm 
done, in an attempt to put the victim in the place they were before the offense. 
Transboundary environmental harm is shorthand for civil wrongs committed by one State, 
its nationals or multinational organizations against the environmental integrity and 
resources of another State. In contrast to a criminal action, a civil international 
environmental action does not necessarily carry an ethical or moral judgment with its legal 
determination. The deterrence value of this type of law is the caution exercised by those 
who do not want to be materially liable for harm caused to others. It is therefore 
imperative that the mechanisms for assigning liability and recovering potential damages are 
founded in principles shared throughout the international community and a long-term view 
of reciprocal benefit. 
“Criminal law” here is meant to cover actions attempting to sanction States, 
organizations and individuals for reckless or purposeful environmental harm inflicted upon 
targeted communities in the course of transboundary activities. The deterrence value of 
criminal law in this context is to warn States and individuals who contemplate inflicting 
                                                
1 Can You Hear Me Now? The Case for Extending the International Judicial Network. 10 Chi. J. Int'l L. 
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environmental harm outside of their territorial boundaries that such conduct carries 
consequences. The moral consequences, commonly considered diplomatic “shaming,” and 
the economic and political consequences of various forms of sanctioning - limiting 
movement, trade, etc. for individuals and States - are contemplated. 
Diplomatic Theory in the context of Environmental Treaty Making 
 
Environmental diplomacy is considered here as a distinct subset of international 
negotiations. The mechanisms for answering uniquely ecological legal questions and the 
need to incorporate innovative strategies to prevent and alleviate environmental harms are 
unique within the field of international affairs. The negotiations necessary to create a 
convention that might birth a new international court would be equally challenging.  The 
emergence of the International Criminal Court in 1999 marked an important period in 
international legal history. To date, 114 States have submitted to the jurisdiction of a 
court that could prosecute their nationals, independent of domestic judicial and political 
will. The trajectory of the formation of the ICC is instructive in the quest for a tribunal 
that might take competency over transboundary environmental crimes. The diplomacy 
that helped realized the Montreal Protocol process is an example of an environmental 
treaty regime that limited State governments and generated a treaty regime that was 
effective and relied on innovative diplomatic approaches. The formative processes that 
helped to create the ICC and the Montreal Protocol may inform proposals for an IEC. 
Both types of diplomacy – environmental and what might be termed “judicial” as 
                                                                                                                                            
233, 240 (2009). 
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necessary to form a new court – would need to be levied by advocates and diplomats from 
States dedicated to a convention on environmental norms and rights. The following 
discussion focuses on the role that environmental diplomacy might play in measuring the 
potential for an IEC. The IEC that is envisioned might exercise broad personal jurisdiction 
over States and individual actors and hold competency to hear a range of environmental 
claims – both civil and criminal. 
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Chapter Two: International Environmental Torts: Climate Change Litigation 
 
Current international judicial institutions are likely insufficient to address the 
impending impacts of climate change, especially since these impacts are most likely to be 
felt most acutely by already marginalized communities. These communities either 
represented by their States or on their own behalf, face jurisdictional and justiciability 
hurdles that have thus far rendered current international legal fora impotent to address 
their needs. Legal remedies may afford a measure of protection, even if retrospective, for 
those who suffer from climate impacts. A legal challenge at an international tribunal would 
require innovative legal theories. Questions of jurisdictional attachment and causation 
have particularly challenged international legal scholars who have contemplated such 
actions. The legal competency of current international tribunals may be insufficient for 
climate change litigation to move forward. The need for an environmental tribunal, which 
could hear claims based on damages from climate change, is topical, but not confined to 
climate change actions. It seems unlikely that increasingly large scale and cumulatively 
intensive human actions will harmonize with natural systems sufficiently to forestall 
future detriments to the global environment. 
This section looks at four major international judicial bodies that have been 
proffered as possible forums for claims aimed at redressing the affects of climate change. 
The following examples do not amount to an exhaustive list of international legal bodies, 
but rather are representative of the types of institutions potentially available to climate 
actions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), often called the World Court, is a forum 
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for States to address grievances with other States. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR) is a regional judicial institution that interprets and applies the human 
rights treaty under which it was established. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a 
tribunal created to prosecute individuals accused of four distinct crimes: crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggression and genocide.  The International Tribunal of 
the Law of the Seas (ITLOS) is the adjudicatory body established to hear claims under 
provisions of the Law of the Seas. 
These different international fora provide opportunities for potential causes of 
action that might be brought against parties contributing to climate change. The four 
chosen represent different arguments for whether international environmental claims could 
or should be heard. The ICJ might be argued as the best place for such claims to best 
support the development of public international environmental law. The ICC has been 
proffered as the best venue because of the potential for describing climate damages as 
grave international crimes. Hearing a climate claim at a human rights venue could be 
recognition of environmental rights in international law. Finally, a forum with a specific 
competency over a specific environmental treaty regime has been thought to provide the 
most viable legal avenue for a climate claim.  
After describing the problem and potential judicial venues, the following section 
focuses on a potential cause of action akin to a tort action in the United States. The 
discussion of this potential action focuses on a potential action at the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) with a primary analysis of the applicable 
causation standard under international law. This section applies current international law 
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with the goal of providing legal protections for those most endangered by global climate 
change - indigenous peoples. To this end, a brief introduction to a concept of international 
environmental justice is included here. 
It is the aim of this thesis to center those most affected by climate change in the 
discussion of possible legal avenues for redress and protection. Indigenous populations in 
areas susceptible to rising tides, desertification and species loss/migration will likely bear 
the brunt of climate change and in most cases have contributed little to global emissions of 
climate altering greenhouse gases. These populations often have fewer political rights and 
less political power, inhabit already fragile ecosystems, rely directly on natural resources, 
have less resources for increasingly inevitable adaptation and are most likely to suffer 
cultural destruction from deteriorating environments. Considerations of expediency aside, 
in order for these populations to be adequately represented in international legal fora and 
enjoy some measure of legal redress the best option for potential adjudication may be the 
development of a forum that can adequately hear tortious environmental claims. The 
current international judicial framework may be insufficient because of the limitations 
described below. A new international convention specifically dedicated to environmental 
harms may be necessary to achieve justice and offer protections for indigenous and 
politically marginalized communities. 




It is well established that indigenous communities will likely bear the brunt of 
negative climate change effects.2 In particular, indigenous peoples living in arctic regions, 
on Small Island States, in areas prone to desertification and in areas already suffering from 
biodiversity loss are in danger and have in some cases already been forced to migrate to 
other areas. In the arctic, Inuit peoples have already petitioned the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, for hearings to be held in order to seek relief from the 
results of global warming.3 In part, reliance on international forums is necessary because 
the problems such communities face are global in nature, but also because international 
law allows for commonality across borders and promises to provide citizens of the world 
a forum for hearing grievances.4 
The primary goal of actions to utilize public international law to combat climate 
change should be rooted in the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. Many 
authors have searched for protections through currently recognized human rights regimes, 
but none have sufficiently provided for the protections from climate change that 
indigenous populations require. There are many reasons why marginalized groups and the 
                                                
2 See generally, “State of the World's Indigenous Peoples.” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
United Nations. UN 2009. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP_web.pdf 
(last visited 05/06/2010). Chapter III: Environment is particularly illustrative of the effects of climate 
change on indigenous populations. 
3 See Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations 
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States 13-20 (Dec. 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-
human-rights-on-behalf- of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Petition]. 
4 “The growth of a network of international courts and tribunals increasingly provides individuals across 
the globe with access to remedies that they could not have domestically, partially redressing inequalities 
and the moral arbitrariness of citizenship and birth.” Cesare P. R. Romano, Can You Hear Me Now? The 
Case for Extending the International Judicial Network. 10 Chi. J. Int'l L. 233, 235 (2009). 
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individuals within these groups might search out international forums.5 In each case the 
goal is restorative or corrective justice. 
One of the goals of this discussion is to explore three strands of current 
international law: sovereign-State analysis, human rights frameworks and international 
criminal law. The examination aims to find where environmental harm to humans might fit 
best within the frameworks of judicial institutions that currently exist and investigate 
alternative options. One of the problems with trying to fit environmental harm into 
current frameworks is articulated by Professor Hari Osofsky: 
International environmental law primarily focuses on environmental 
damage, rather than on its impact on human beings. Its ultimate end is 
certainly to serve human purposes; both treaty and customary 
international environmental law aim to solve problems that matter to 
people, and our species' survival may depend on our ability to find more 
sustainable approaches. But the focus of environmental treaties is primarily 
on constraining environmentally deleterious behavior, rather than on 
preventing injuries to people.6 
 
A shift in focus may be necessary to accomplish justice for a broad range of populations 
who are currently effected by harm and for those who will be increasingly affected by 
climate change. 
Osofsky looks to developments in domestic environmental justice movements to 
provide some answers as to how international environmental law might accommodate the 
                                                
5 “Sometimes domestic courts do not exist (for example, because they have been closed down by war), are 
unable to dispense justice impartially, or lack jurisdiction over one of the parties (for example, the 
defendant is shielded by the sovereign immunity doctrine). In these cases, the individual can bypass the 
domestic level and directly access competent international jurisdictions, should they exist.” Id. at 239. Hari 
Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 71, 78 (2005). 
6 Hari Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental 
Rights, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 71, 78 (2005). 
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needs of indigenous peoples. Osofsky's method is the case study. She moves across the 
globe surveying instances of environmental adjudication to uncover factors that connect 
environmental winners and losers. She focuses on the need for coordinated advocacy, 
searching for a centralized institution, actor or movement to bind similar cases that have 
no interconnected support.7 Ultimately, Osofsky believes that, “the most helpful 
development for victims of environmental harms would be a binding environmental rights 
treaty that creates a corresponding judicial forum with enforcement authority. That forum 
would have jurisdiction over not only State parties, but also non-State petitioners and 
defendants.”8 The following discussion of international fora that exist under the current 
treaty regimes applicable to climate change litigation illuminate why this need may be so 
acute. 
The Current International Judicial Framework 
 
The four judicial bodies that are discussed below have different virtues and 
limitations. Primarily their applicability to climate change actions relates to differences in 
scope of both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The International Court of Justice 
may only hear cases between States. In the context of the rights of indigenous 
populations, those States with significantly burdened inhabitants would likely need to 
bring the suit. Complicating this is the necessity for two States to consent to an ICJ 
proceeding. The International Criminal Court may hear petitions from individuals so the 
problem of personal jurisdiction that the ICJ presents is not operative. However, unlike 
                                                
7 Id. at 131. 
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the ICJ, the ICC is limited by the four causes of action included in its organic statute, not 
by the bounds of applicable international law. The IAHRC has a broad subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which encompasses a growing international human rights regime. However, as 
a regional body its jurisdictional limitations are theoretically territorial in nature. ITLOS 
may be the best of the available forums in which to bring a climate change action because 
it has a broad jurisdictional reach and clear structural advantages. However, current 
standards of international law would pose significant challenges there, as well. 
A. International Court of Justice: Getting to Court 
The ICJ is the judicial arm of the United Nations and one of the principle organs of 
the organization, as provided for in Article 7 of the UN Charter.9 The Charter also 
references the Court in Article 36, which States that “as a general rule” the Security 
Council should refer legal disputes to the ICJ.10 Chapter XIV, which is comprised of 
Articles 92 through 96, specifically outlines the institutional structure of the Court. The 
Statute of the ICJ, an annexed “integral part” of the Charter that organizes the 
composition and functioning of the Court, supplements the articles of the Charter.11 
Chapter XIV makes all UN member States de facto parties to the Statute of the 
ICJ and provides for compliance to ICJ decisions enforceable by the Security Council. 
Importantly, Article 96 provides for the Security Council or the General Assembly to 
request advisory opinions “on any legal question.” The Statute of the ICJ makes clear that 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Id. at 129. 
9 UN Charter art. 7, para. 1. 
10 Id. art. 36. 
11 Statute of the International Court of Justice, effective Oct. 24, 1954, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. 
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only States may be parties in cases before the Court and that their involvement in cases is 
dependent on their own referral of a case. In effect, one State may not compel another 
State to involvement in a case. Both States must agree to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court. However, the Statute also provides for the adjudication of all matters provided for 
in the Charter, which includes advisory opinions on legal questions. 
Andrew Strauss has thoroughly outlined possible climate change litigation before 
the ICJ. He proposes that bringing a suit based on a State's detrimental effect of climate 
change is possible under the above ICJ framework.12 As described above, States must 
consent to ICJ jurisdiction. Since this is extremely unlikely in the case of climate change 
litigation, Strauss relies on two “back door” routes to State consent to ICJ jurisdiction: 
The second way the Court could attain jurisdiction is if under the so-called 
optional clause of the Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, the respondent State 
has prospectively entered a declaration accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the court for the kind of dispute being litigated, and the 
applicant State has allowed in its own declaration that, in accordance with 
the rule of reciprocity, it would itself be subject to the Court's jurisdiction 
were it to be sued in a case of similar nature. Finally, the third way that the 
Court could gain jurisdiction also pursuant to Article 36(1), is if the parties 
have specifically provided for dispute resolution before the Court in a 
pertinent treaty which is in effect between the parties.13 
 
Strauss's argument for bringing a case to the ICJ is based on the assumption that 
doing so would be advantageous because, “a favourable ruling by the ICJ could provide an 
authoritatively sanctioned reference point around which public opinion can crystallize by 
                                                
12 Andrew Strauss. Climate change litigation : opening the door to the International Court of Justice in 
Adjudicating Climate Change : State, National, and International Approaches (William C.G. Burns, Hari 
M. Osofsky, eds.) Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009. 334 – 356. 
13 Id. at 340. 
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imbuing that claim with the official imprimatur of law.”14 He recognizes that the ruling 
would only be applicable to State responsibility for climate change impacts rather than 
any private actor's responsibility. In a world increasingly threatened by the actions of 
multinational corporations, this limitation would seem to fatally restrict a broad range of 
important litigation. However, Strauss believes that an ICJ ruling could still potentially 
impact domestic litigation against corporations. He posits that domestic tort actions 
(nuisance or negligence) targeting corporations based on their contribution to global 
warming would require establishment of some offense to a “community-wide standard of 
behavior.” Strauss believes that the ICJ ruling could help establish this standard.15 
The tenuous possibility of bringing a case based on climate change to the ICJ and 
the only possibly constructive and concededly indirect effect such a suit would have on 
the primary corporate offenders of actions that substantially contribute to climate change 
likely make this route an unsuccessful one for indigenous peoples. Often, the activities of 
corporations occur in States where the domestic framework of regulation and tort law are 
either insufficient or exist within a framework of corruption that does not allow for 
effective redress of grievances.16 Even within States where these complications may not 
be fatal to possible litigation efforts, the relative position of political powerlessness and 
economic disadvantage of indigenous communities in such States is a frustrating factor for 
legal activity. 
                                                
14 Id at 337. Strauss cites Robert Y. Jennings, The United Nations at Fifty: The International Court of 
Justice After Fifty Years, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 493 (1995) as a “classic work discussing the role and influence 
of the International Court of Justice to support this claim.” 
15 Id. at 338. 
16 See Ecuadorian example, infra. 
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Still, Strauss is somewhat confident that States could bring suits by way of the 
two methods described above. In order for States to be able to bring suit under the first 
method there would need to be the coincidence of both the applicant and responding party 
having accepted compulsory jurisdiction over a claim of international liability.17 Strauss 
believes that a claim might be made within the context of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Under the 
Kyoto Protocol developed States and lesser-developed States are separately categorized 
and have different responsibilities and obligations. Generally speaking, under the Protocol 
developed States must reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases and developing States 
are encouraged to engage in development that, to the extent possible, does not compound 
the climate change problem. Strauss believes that, 
To the extent . . . that such developed countries are themselves victims of 
global warming, a potential claim could be explored against fellow 
developed countries that are not bearing their share of the responsibility for 
the global warming problem, either because they do not appear to be on 
track to meet their emission reduction obligations, including under the 
Protocol, or they have not acceded to the Protocol and are not otherwise 
bearing their share of the responsibility for the global warming problem.18 
 
Strauss spends the majority of his analysis on this point, searching for countries that 
might fit this bill. 
 His assessment is that countries who have acceded to the Kyoto Protocol but who 
have not complied with its obligations and have accepted compulsory jurisdiction under 
Article 36(2) of the ICJ are the most likely to be targets of litigation.19 However, one 
                                                
17 Id. at 340. 
18 Id. at 339. 
19 Id. at 341. 
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problem that he notes is that “[a]ll of the nine countries that have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 – except for Denmark, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway – have entered reservations to their acceptances excepting disputes which the 
parties agree to settle by other means of peaceful settlement.”20 This might be problematic 
because the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol provide for States party to it to settle 
disputes, “through negotiations or any other peaceful means of their choice.”21 His 
“general conclusion is that a persuasive case could be made that the ICJ could assert 
jurisdiction over disputes under the UNFCCC and Protocol if they involve counties that 
have opted into the binding jurisdiction of that Court regardless of whether they have 
done so subject to an other means of peaceful settlement provision.”22  
 In essence, Strauss believes that just because the specific treaty at issue provides 
for the parties to a dispute to choose the means of dispute resolution, compulsory ICJ 
jurisdiction over a dispute arising from that treaty may well still attach. Even by 
successfully overcoming this jurisdictional hurdle Strauss realizes that the real question at 
issue is a substantive law one. “[C]ountries attempting to formulate climate change claims 
so as to achieve maximum impact in an ICJ proceeding would be unlikely to conceptualize 
them as solely a question of compliance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol even 
if they and their adversaries were party to theses agreements.”23 
Strauss also looks at the possibility of a party bringing a claim to the ICJ based on 
an independent treaty, reflecting the second jurisdictional option listed above. Here, he is 
                                                
20 Id. at 343. 
21 Id. at 342. 
22 Id. at 344. 
20 
 
forced to rely on the seemingly weak prospect of finding parties who are both members of 
agreements with extremely broad treaty language, which may cover climate change 
activities. Here he focuses on a class of treaties described as Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) treaties.24 He does find some precedent in FCN treaties being used to 
bring suits not previously contemplated to the ICJ,25 and concludes that a case might be 
brought if a treaty “negotiated in the context of protecting the mutual commercial interests 
of countries' citizens can be construed to protect them form harm caused by global 
warming.” 
These jurisdictional hurdles are instructive here primarily in the sense that their 
complexity and lack of certainty make plain that the UNFCCC treaty regime in 
conjunction with ICJ jurisdiction presents an uphill battle for successful claims to be 
heard. This is particularly troubling since, other than the UNFCCC “the international 
community has not developed specific treaties to deal explicitly with the normative 
dimensions of the global warming problem.”26 Strauss is more hopeful in his assessment in 
that he hopes that his analysis will “further a discussion of how the door to that forum 
might be opened.”27 Still, as the ICJ is constituted now, the State maneuvering necessary 
get a case to the Court is substantial and would be tied to political considerations such as 
the adversarial process's effect on future negotiations for a climate change treaty regime to 
follow the Kyoto Protocol. 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 345. 
25 Strauss' example involves the bombing of vessels during a military conflict, which seems far-flung from 




 Strauss's analysis of the law that the ICJ would rely upon illustrates that even to 
the extent that a claim based on climate change is possible, the ICJ is an ill-suited forum 
for the redress of grievances suffered by discrete communities within States. In addition, 
the reality of a State bringing a claim that might serve to protect those most affected is 
even more circumspect, considering the relative political power impoverishment of such 
communities. The example of the threatened petition by the small island nation of Tuvalu 
is illustrative of this point.28  
 In 2002, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu announced that the people of Tuvalu would 
bring a suit in the ICJ claiming the inaction of the United States on the problem of climate 
change threatened their sovereignty.29 Tuvalu is a coral island that some scientists predict 
will be inundated by rising sea levels within the next 50 years.30 Many scientists attribute 
this sea level rise to climate change and the position of the Prime Minister in 2002 was 
that the threat to the island chain from the impacts of climate change were “real, and are 
already threatening our very survival and existence.”31 Tuvalu's legal threat was never 
carried out, but the novel hypothetical approach to combating climate change sparked 
discussion about the possibility of bringing such a suit to the ICJ. Beside the procedural 
                                                                                                                                            
26 Id. at 350. 
27 Id. at 356. 
28 Strauss makes note of the Tuvalu example, but in a footnote he puts the onus on the failing of the threat 
on changing political condition in Tuvalu. Id. at 339 note 18. 
29 Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs. Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the 
United States in the International Court of Justice, 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 103, 103 (2005) 
30 Id. at 104. 
31 Id. citing Rt. Hon. Bikenibeu Paeniu, Prime Ministerial Special Envoy on Climate Change, Tuvalu 
statement on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Third Conference of 
Parties (Dec. 8, 1997), available at http://www.tuvaluislands.com/kyoto-panieu.htm (last visited May. 14, 
2010); Piers Moore Ede, That Sinking Feeling: Their Island Nation on the Verge of Disappearing Due to 
Sea Level Rise, Citizens of Tuvalu Prepare for Repatriation, 17 Earth Island J. 39 (2003) available at 
http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/that_sinking_feeling/ (last visited May 14, 2010). 
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problems that Strauss observes, substantive issues might preclude Tuvalu from 
establishing liability under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. First, the UNFCCC allows 
parties to refrain from taking preventative measures if they are not cost effective. The 
U.S. might cite economic hazards from emissions reductions or the U.S. might 
successfully argue that the convention is not binding.32 
The current international climate change regime may simply be insufficient for 
presenting the basis of possible litigation in the ICJ. Still, looking at the hypothetical 
Tuvalu case gives insight into what aspects of international law are at the disposal of all 
States that may want to bring a climate claim against another State.33 The first set of 
concerns deal with harm: what harm has been caused and who is causing the harm. Tuvalu 
would need to prove that the United States was harming it through its inaction on the 
issue of climate change. Once established, Tuvalu would need to argue the international 
law principles of sovereign equality and State liability for harmful activity apply. The 
principle of sovereign equality ensures that a State has a “sovereign right over its own 
resources.”34 These principles are uncontested, so incidence and causation would simply 
need to be shown. The principle of State sovereignty underlies the entire international 
system of governance that is currently in place. Additionally, State liability for harmful 
activity occurring on the territory of another sovereign State is a well-founded principle in 
international law. The decision in the Trail Smelter Case is guiding precedent for the 
                                                
32 Jacobs at 111. 
33 The following is a restatement of the assessment made by Jacobs of the substantive law claims Tuvalu 




principle of protection from harm from another State.35 With these principles at a State's 
disposal harm may be easy enough to prove – damages from climate change are already 
occurring. In this case, Tuvalu is actually sinking. The real problem here would be proving 
causation. Even if the ICJ would allow for climate change to be the mode of causation, the 
case would necessarily target a particular State. In the Tuvalu hypothetical the United 
States was targeted. However, the possibility of ascribing causation to activities of the 
United States at the ICJ is questionable.36 
Tuvalu would also likely want to attempt to obtain prospective relief.37 However, 
this would be an even greater challenge than making claims based on sovereignty. The 
necessary principles for prospective relief may be intergenerational equity and the 
precautionary principle.38 These principles do not enjoy the same status in international 
law and relations as sovereign equality and the prohibition on transborder harm. Further, 
“[t]he ICJ has never granted prospective or future damages to parties.”39  The ICJ has 
heard cases requesting prospective relief, but has “dodged” the issue whenever it has been 
presented.40 Tuvalu could have claimed relief based on intergenerational equity, premising 
“that humans, as part of a ‘natural system,’ have a responsibility to protect the present 
                                                
35 “[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United States, no State has the 
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury . . . in or to the territory of 
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.” Jacobs at 120. citing Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 35 
Am. J. Int'l L. 684, 685 (1941). See Appendix A. 
36 “Without clear and convincing proof that the United States' emissions are the cause of Tuvalu's injury, 
the ICJ may reject Tuvalu's claims for direct damage.” Id. at 121. 
37 “While Tuvalu is already experiencing damage from global warming, the worst is yet to come.” Id. 
38 Id. at 119. 
39 Id. at 121. 
40 Jacobs cites the Nuclear Test Cases as examples of cases looking for prospective relief. Although Jacobs 
outlines the ICJ's reluctance to hear prospective claims, she does believe that “[d]espite the ICJ's refusal in 
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and future of their environment.”41 In addition to a claim based in intergenerational equity, 
Tuvalu might also bring a claim based on the United States’ actions contravening the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle “suggests that a country should not 
refuse to regulate activity simply because it is scientifically uncertain whether the activity 
will cause harm.”42  Tuvalu would need to argue that both these principles are valid 
customary international law.43 It seems clear that, similar to the procedural maneuvering 
necessary to gain standing to bring a climate change case before the ICJ, prospective relief 
would require stretching the bounds of current international law. Of course, this is part 
and parcel of any groundbreaking litigation. It is still important to point out that without 
the strengthening of new tools such as the principle of intergenerational equity and the 
precautionary principle,44 any comprehensive claims of climate change litigation may not 
be feasible. This is why a new international convention recognizing and codifying these 
principles may be necessary. 
The challenges that Tuvalu, or another State would face are perhaps 
insurmountable in the context of bringing litigation to the ICJ, both on issues of 
justiciability and substance. While much of this is attributable directly to the unique 
                                                                                                                                            
the Nuclear Test Cases to rule on the issue of prospective damages, future cases involving prospective 
damages from the effects of global warming may force the ICJ finally to face this issue.” Id. at 122. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ provides, “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (b) international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 5. 
44 Both of these principles do have precedent in international law, e.g. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, 
which notes: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 1992. Available at 
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challenge of climate change it is clear that attempting to find redress in a venue such as the 
ICJ, which deals exclusively with State actors is highly problematic. Other than the issues 
brought up above, there is also the fundamental problem of interstate litigation excluding 
the voices of the individuals who are actually harmed and the potential for finding non-
State actors liable for acute harms they perpetrate. In some measure, international human 
rights law attempts to fill this gap. The IAHRC is one example of a forum where human 
rights, and therefore the individuals who are most harmed, are central. 
B. Regional Human Rights Court: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The advent of regional human rights courts began in 1959 with the constituting of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Two other regional human rights courts have 
followed this innovation in international law, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
in 1979 and the African Union Court of Human and Peoples' Rights in 2004. The genesis 
of these courts show increased judicial capacity to hear human rights claims throughout 
the world and are just three examples of judicial fora that have or have had competency in 
the area of human rights.45 However, the problems associated with climate change are 
likely outside the jurisdiction of these courts. “In sum, as long as human rights courts 
apply treaties that have been drafted between the 1950s and the 1970s, the rights they can 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163. However, 
their usefulness at the ICJ has not been shown. 
45 See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 
31 NYU J Intl L & Pol 709, 748-51 (1998-99).(Synoptic Chart). Romano writes that in addition to the 
three human rights courts listed “[t]here is also a remarkable array of quasi-judicial and implementation-
control bodies, such as the various committees established under the UN human rights treaties. There are 
in total about two dozen, counting both the global and regional levels.” The chart has since been updated. 
The most recent version (Nov 3, 2004) is available online at <http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf> (visited May 14, 2010), reprinted in Jose E. Alvarez, 
International Organizations as Law-Makers 404-47 (Oxford 2005). 
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vindicate will remain necessarily confined to the core human rights, leaving many aspects 
of human life untouched”46 One example of the insufficiency of human rights courts to 
deal with the impacts of climate change comes from the Petition made by North American 
Inuit peoples to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
In December 2005 a petition was filed in the IACHR on behalf of all Inuit of the 
arctic regions of the United States of America and Canada claiming that the United States 
violated the human rights of the Inuit through its action and inactions relating to climate 
change.47 In response, the IACHR found that the petition failed to present facts sufficient 
to characterize a violation under the IACHR treaty.48 The significance of the attempt was 
the creative lawyering that it embodied: 
It reframes a problem, typically treated as an environmental one through a 
human rights lens, and moves beyond the confines of U.S. law to a 
supranational forum. In so doing, the petition lies at the intersection of two 
streams of cases occurring at multiple levels of governance: (1) 
environmental rights litigation and petitions and (2) climate change 
litigation and petitions.49 
 
The currently unsuccessful petition by the Inuit was an attempt to bridge 
environmental and human rights.50 The environmental impacts of climate change on the 
Inuit are extreme and obvious and the human rights implications are severe.51 
                                                
46 Romano at 260. 
47 Inuit Petition, supra note 3. 
48 Letter from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Sec'y, Organization of American States, to Paul 
Crowley, Legal Rep. (Nov. 16, 2006), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf. 
49 Hari Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous 
Peoples' Rights. 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 675, 676 (2007). 
50 Id. at 688. 
51 For example, Osofsky lists “Melting permafrost and worsening storms damage their homes. Changes in 
animal populations threaten their livelihood as hunting becomes more precarious. Ice thaws make it 
dangerous to use traditional travel routes. The ground is literally shifting under the Inuit's feet and 
everything from weather prediction to igloo building is not what it once was.” as some of the 
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Unfortunately, it seems that the limitations of a regional human rights tribunal would be 
fatal to a climate change petition or other attempts to have a claim adjudicated on the basis 
of a human right to a healthy environment. However, the agreements that bore these 
courts may serve as good examples for a global treaty based on environmental rights 
enjoyed by all humans. 
C. International Criminal Court: Subject Matter Competency 
As described above, the International Criminal Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over four specific activities criminalized under its organic statute, which does 
not deal with civil wrongs. Nonetheless, the court is a strong model for the creation of an 
international adjudicatory body with a particularized competency. The jurisdiction of the 
court extends to all the members who have acceded to the Rome Statute, which created 
the court. Currently there are 114 States that are members. Significant absences in the 
membership of the court include the United States, China, India and Russia. The court has 
been described as “truly the first court of humanity, a break-through that only twenty 
years ago would have been unimaginable.”52 The court is unique in its scope of personal 
jurisdiction and for being an international forum that is empowered to impose criminal 
sanctions. However, “this astonishing development has only affected one facet of justice 
[criminal] and has left largely untouched the corrective dimension [civil].”53 In this way 
                                                                                                                                            
environmental impacts.” Id. at 685. While the human rights impacts include violations of, “their right to 
enjoy the benefits of their culture, the right to use and enjoy lands they have traditionally occupied, their 
right to use and enjoy their personal property, the right to the preservation of health,  the right to life, 
physical integrity, and security, the right to their own means of subsistence, and their rights to residence 
and movement and inviolability of the home. Id. at 686. 




the court is likely unable to attack the problems of communities who face environmental 
harm due to climate change or other claims that do not fit within the specific competency 
of the court. 
One proposition for rectifying the ICC's lack of application to environmental 
matters is to create a new cause of action for the court. This cause of action has been 
discussed in different formulations, but the term ecocide, corresponding with the court's 
current crime of genocide has a long history in the context of war. In 1973, Robert Falk 
wrote an article detailing the ecological atrocities committed by the United States 
government during the Vietnam War.54 Essentially, the United States embarked on a 
campaign of ecological destruction, which included efforts to deforest large areas of 
Southeast Asia (allegedly to deprive adversaries of natural cover and create staging 
grounds for hostilities), which had multiple adverse effects on the populations dependent 
on the vegetation in these areas. Falk also considered other tactics such as indiscriminate 
bombing and weather manipulation as amounting to ecocide. Falk's article is the seminal 
piece discussing the use and validity of environmental warfare in Vietnam. Falk's article 
also concludes with concrete proposals for taking action to create a convention on 
environmental warfare. Various authors who have undertaken the challenge of fashioning a 
useful definition of ecocide and a path for its functional implementation in international 
law have cited Falk’s proposals.55 
                                                
54 Richard A. Falk, Environmental Warefare and Ecocide – Facts, Appraisals, and Proposals, 4 Bul. 
Peace Proposals 80 (1973) 
55 Avi Brisman, Crime-Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice, 6 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 
727 (2008); Carl E. Bruch, All's not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage 
in Internal Armed Conflict, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 695 (2001);  Drumbl, 1998. Mark A. Drumbl, International 
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One of these scholars, Professor Mark A. Drumbl, has analyzed the viability of 
bringing an ecocide claim to the International Criminal Court. Drumbl starts his analysis 
by looking at the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). “ENMOD was intended to prohibit 
the hostile use of large-scale environmental modification such as the deforestation 
practiced by the United States in Vietnam, as well as possible new forms of environmental 
modification including weather control and deliberate destruction of the ozone layer.”56 A 
provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court's follows ENMOD and 
is found in Article 8, which defines “war crimes” and prohibits: 
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.57 
 
Drumbl analyzes this section of the Statute as a legal scholar, focusing on the 
standard two elements necessary for any crime while applying this section as a 
                                                                                                                                            
Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and Environmental Security: Can the International 
Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?, 6 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 305 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, The 
International Responses to the Environmental Impacts of War, 17 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 565 (2005); 
Okorodudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian Gulf: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 St. Mary's 
L.J. 123 (1991); Marcos A. Orellana, Criminal Punishment for Environmental Damage: Individual and 
State Responsibility at a Crossroad, 17 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 673 (2005); Parsons (1998); Peter J. 
Richards and Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment During Armed 
Conflict, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 1047 (1999); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the 
Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (1997); Stefanie N. Simonds, 
Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 
Stan. J. Int'l L. 165 (1992); Ludwik A. Teclaff, Beyond Restoration – The Case of Ecocide, 34 Nat. 
Resources J. 933 (1994); Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: 
Environmental Crimes or Humanitarian Atrocities?, 17 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 697 (2005); Ensign 
Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons: “Greening” the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally 
Protective Regime, 11 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 793 (1996). 
56 Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and 
Environmental Damage in Non-International Conflicts, 15 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1, 18 (2004). 
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hypothetical definition of a crime of ecocide. First, he analyzes the hypothetical actus 
reus, which is the actual physical action needed to be accomplished for the crime to have 
been committed. Next, he looks at the hypothetical mens rea of the crime, which is the 
mental component of the crime necessary to be present in an offender for the crime’s 
perpetration. 
The actus reus necessary here is the language that was noted from ENMOD 
above, “widespread, long-term and severe.” However, there is a major discrepancy 
between the wording in the Rome Statute and the version in ENMOD, the conjunction 
“and” – in ENMOD the word used to join the three terms is “or”. To rise to the level of 
an environmental crime at the International Criminal Court, the action must include all 
three qualifiers. Drumbl finds fault in the interpretation of the three qualifiers as well. 
First he notes that the parameters described above in reference to ENMOD are 
specifically stated in that treaty regime to pertain only to that treaty.58 Further, he notes, 
“the “widespread” and “long-term” principles attempt to ascribe temporal and geographic 
limitations on environmental harm that, for the most part, does not know such 
boundaries.”59 Lastly, he finds that “[t]he anthropocentric limitation of “severe” damage 
to that which affects human life and human consumption of natural resources underscores 
a more general shortcoming with the existing framework of environmental protection 
during wartime, namely that this protection is not geared to protecting the environment 
                                                                                                                                            
57 United Nations Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, (2 April 1998). 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv). 




per se, but, rather, humanity's need to make use of it.”60 In general, he finds fault in 
applying ecocide to the strictures of the Rome Statute's actus reus requirements because 
the paradigm of human victims of harm is inconsistent with the needs of an environmental 
crime.61 
Drumbl also find the mens rea component problematic since the intent requirement 
excludes negligence. Those who negligently or carelessly harm the environment are outside 
the bounds of the Rome Statute's formulation. Drumbl argues for a more objective 
standard for mental culpability, incorporating a satisfaction of mens rea where “there was 
a reasonable expectation that environmental damage would occur.”62 He cites the 
negotiations from the development of the standard in the Rome Statute to argue that such 
a reading is unlikely.63 
Drumbl believes that attempting to prosecute ecocide under the Rome Statute 
would also be severely limited by the language constituting the “clearly excessive” caveat 
to liability. This caveat is bounded by military necessity. Drumbl notes that such a caveat 
does not exist in international law for the crimes of genocide and torture. Gauging the 
seriousness of ecological damage in and of itself and in its effects on current and future 
generations he writes, “the time may have come to question whether humanity's recourse 
to physical aggression to settle national or local disputes ought ever to trump 
environmental integrity.”64 In sum, regarding the efficacy of using the Rome Statute as a 
                                                
60 Id. at 129. 
61 “A paradigm shift would focus on the environment as the victim of the harm, not humanity.” Id. 
62 Id. at 133. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 135. 
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framework for prosecuting ecocide, Drumbl believes that “[t]he international community's 
decision to criminalize the willful infliction of “widespread, long-term, and severe damage 
to the natural environment” is cause for limited celebration, considerable disappointment, 
and some concern.”65 Work by Falk and Drumbl are both discussed further below in the 
section dedicated to “ecocide” as an international crime. Here it is sufficient to note that 
Drumbl’s critique is a convincing indictment of the ICC’s inability to hear environmental 
claims that were contemplated under its organic statute. 
Problems with bringing a potential criminal cause of action based on environmental 
degradation are inclusive of an action premised on climate change. As shown above, the 
only provision that currently contemplates the environment in the Rome Statute deals 
with war crimes. Even if a new cause of action would be added to the ICC it is unlikely 
that it could function as a competent tribunal for plaintiffs seeking civil remedies. 
D. International Tribunal of the Law of the Seas 
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNLCOS) is an example 
of a particularized treaty regime that may provide an avenue for redress to States that are 
particularly affected by destruction to the marine environment occurring from climate 
change effects. UNCLOS provides “a legal order for the seas and oceans [to] facilitate 
international communication, and . . . promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, 
the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living 




resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.”66 This 
may be a sufficient subject matter jurisdictional hook to allow climate change actions 
under UNCLOS.  
Scholars have proposed using the binding dispute resolution mechanism in 
UNCLOS to challenge States that are potentially adversely affecting the marine 
environment through their inaction on climate change mitigation.67 Part XV of UNCLOS 
outlines the dispute resolution mechanism, which provides States with four potential 
means for settlement of disputes:68 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS),69 the International Court of Justice; an arbitral panel; or a special arbitral panel.70 
“States may choose to declare their choice of forum, but in cases where they have not, or 
Parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for dispute settlement, the 
dispute must be submitted to binding arbitration unless the Parties agree otherwise. To 
date, the vast majority of Parties to UNCLOS have, de facto, chosen arbitration by their 
silence on the matter.”71 
UNCLOS has been described as creating “a binding system of obligations and 
dispute resolutions, which confers on a forum international jurisdiction, authority, and 
implementing powers that exceed those of other international environmental law forums 
                                                
66 United Nations, Convention of the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 Preamble, 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, (last visited 
May 25, 2010) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
67 See generally, Will Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in International 
Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, 2 J. Sust. Dev. Law & Policy 27 (2005) and Meinhard Doelle, 
Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, 37 J. 
Ocean Dev. & Intl L. 319 (2006). 
68 UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 296(1). 
69 UNCLOS, supra note 2, at Annex VI. 
70 UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 287(1). 
71 Burns, supra note 1, at 37 citing UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 287(3)-(5). 
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and rival those conferred on the World Trade Organization.”72 Additionally, UNCLOS 
defines pollution as “the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the marine environment . . .which results or is likely to result in such 
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life . . .hindrance to marine 
activities, including fishing.”73 This broad definition of pollution, in addition to the strong 
adjudicatory structures included in the treaty regime make it an ideal place to investigate 
potential climate change litigation claims. 
The following section explores legal issues that may be pertinent to a potential 
case at ITLOS. 
Potential Case at ITLOS 
 
When investigating whether a potential action at ITLOS might be brought and 
argued on the behalf of those affected by climate change in relation to the impacts on the 
marine environment, questions of causation immediately arise. The lack of a clear legal 
standard of causation for damage to the marine environment under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas is a significant hurdle to bringing a successful claim to 
ITLOS. Domestic and international case law are investigated below to help illustrate the 
judicial bounds of such a standard. The standard for proving causation under UNCLOS is 
not altogether clear since an international tribunal has not adjudicated a claim in the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. In addition, other international fora, such as 
                                                
72 Burns, supra note 1 at 37, citing Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environmental 
and 
Economic Development: Article 131(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 583, 596 (2000). 
35 
 
the International Court of Justice have also been reluctant to announce a clear causation 
standard for proving liability for transboundary environmental harm. However, climate 
change litigation scholars have provided some possible remedies to this dearth of clear 
causation standards in international jurisprudence by tapping domestic tort law theories of 
causation. 
A. Factual Introduction 
Climate change scientists predict continued harm to the world’s oceans and marine 
resources. These effects will likely be broad and far-reaching from ocean acidification74 
and the depletion of fish stocks in many parts of the world’s seas to rising tides, which 
threaten to inundate complete small island States and areas of extreme dense population. 
Current international political agreements have so far failed to stem the rising levels of 
greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere, which fuel climate change.75 In this vacuum, 
jurists around the world are increasingly investigating the possibility of bringing judicial 
                                                                                                                                            
73 UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 1(4). 
74 “By the end of this century, projected increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide will result in an almost 
threefold increase in surface ocean carbon dioxide concentrations relative to pre-industrial levels. This, in 
turn, could result in the average pH of the oceans falling by 0.5 unites by 2100, which would translate into 
a three-fold increase in the concentration of hydrogen ions, making the oceans more acidic than they have 
been in 300 million years.” Will Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under 
the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, 7 Sust. Dev. L. & Policy 34, 35 (2007) citing Ulf Riebesell et 
al., Reduced Calcification of Marine Plankton in Response to Increased Atmospheric CO2, 407 NATURE 
364, 364 (2000). 32 Caspar Henderson, Paradise Lost, NEW SCI. 29-30, Aug. 5, 2006; see also Joan A. 
Kleypas et al., Geochemical Consequences of Increased Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide on Coral Reefs, 284 
SCI. 118, 118 (1999); see also The Royal Society, Ocean Acidification Due to Increasing Atmospheric 
Carbon Dioxide, Policy Doc. 12/05 (June, 2005), at 6 available at 
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=13539 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). 
75 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its accompanying Kyoto Protocol 
are the usual suspects here. The Protocol set targets for GHG reductions for developed States and attempted 
to provide pathways to “clean” development to lesser-developed States. The lack of effectiveness of the 
Protocol is generally attributed to a lack of involvement by the United States, the world’s greatest per 
capita GHG emitter, the failure of many States to meet their targets and shifting responsibilities for climate 
change as developing States like China become greater emitters. [cites needed]. 
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actions on behalf of a State based on current multi-lateral international agreements.76 One 
of the significant barriers to bringing such actions is a clear standard for causation in any 
international tribunal. 
Small island States and their indigenous populations are arguably most at risk from 
the ravages of climates change. As described above in the case of Tuvalu, there has been 
interest in bringing a climate change action in international for a by a small island state. In 
addition to Tuvalu, potential small island States in the Pacific may be the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tonga, Vanuatu and Fiji. For 
example, the Marshall Islands are low elevation corral atolls, which may be harmed by sea 
level rise and ocean acidification resulting from climate change. Sea level rise threatens to 
overwhelm such low-lying islands, contributes to the higher salinity of precious arable 
land, and potential contamination of scant freshwater sources. Most threatening are the 
increased risks from climate change of greater storm surges in rising seas. More regular 
and/or stronger surges threaten the physical integrity of these islands. Ocean acidification 
threatens to limit the growth of the coral reefs that sustain tourism and fishing economies 
in small island States. In some extremely fragile locations the actual coral reefs may be 
                                                
76 Two prime examples of these efforts are the continuing petitions to the UNESCO World Heritage 
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work through the World Heritage Committee and a 2009 Petition regarding the effects of black carbon on 




disappearing. It has been "suggested that such countries could be considered United 
Nations Environmental Programme protection as 'endangered species'."77  
B. Legal Principles 
First, it is important to look at the issue of causation. The most basic and famous 
formulation of an environmental legal standard in international law comes from the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration of 1946: 
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.78 
 
However, the generally held proposition that States are required to prevent transboundary 
harm is primarily a duty of care standard, not a causation standard. If this were taken to 
be a causation standard it would amount to strict liability, meaning the damage would be 
compensable regardless of fault. However, the tribunal in Trail Smelter did not answer 
this question definitively.79 In Trail Smelter the court heard testimony from experts 
regarding causation, but ultimately crafted its own determination based on scientific 
recordings.  
                                                
77 National Biodiversity Team of the RMI, 2000.The Marshall Islands - Living Atolls Amidst the Living 
Sea/ The National Biodiversity Report of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. RMI Biodiversity Project. 
ISBN 982-9045-02-1, St. Hildegard Publishing Company, Santa Clarita, CA, USA. 
78 Trail Smelter Arbitration. See Appendix A. 
79 “The Trail Smelter arbitration set the foundations for discussions of responsibility and liability in 
environmental law3 but it left open the question of whether a State exercising all due diligence would be 
liable if transfrontier harm results despite the State’s best efforts. More generally, the tribunal did not clarify 
whether a State is liable only for intentional, reckless or negligent behavior (fault based conduct) or whether 
it is strictly liable for all serious  significant transboundary environmental harm.” Alexandre Kiss and 
Dinah Shelton. “Strict Liability in International Environmental Law” in Law of the Sea, Environmental 
Law and Settlement of Disputes. eds. Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum. p. 1132. 2007. 
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 It has been urged that climate change actions may be brought on tort grounds to 
international for a so that a causation standard might be imported there from domestic 
law.80 Such a case would be similar to a toxic tort case where causation is determined 
through expert testimonies that seek to prove a causal chain linking actions to injury. This 
was the type of evidence presented in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which the tribunal 
there rejected before engaging in its own scientific analysis.81 Ultimately, the Trail Smelter 
tribunal did not lay out a new standard for a showing of factual causation or, as it did 
regarding the “clear and convincing” standard for proof of injury stated above, use 
standards from existing domestic law. If the tribunal had used a domestic standard for 
causation it might have used the “but for” test or the substantial factor test from negligent 
tort doctrine. However, the arbitrators did not expound on any theory of causation in 
their decision and subsequent international legal bodies have followed suit. 
Failing a general principle of causation in international adjudication, treaty law may 
need to be relied upon for a standard of causation. Actions between States may need to be 
brought under a specific treaty regime, such as UNCLOS.82 One avenue for bringing a suit 
under the UNCLOS regime is under the Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 10 Dec. 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks 
                                                
80 David A. Grossman, Tort-Based Climate Litigation in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National 
and International Approaches, (Will C. G. Burns & Hari Osofsky, eds. 2009) 
81 See Trail Smelter Arbitration. 
82 Standing challenges may prove insurmountable to bringing a claim to the ICJ directly. For a thorough 
discussion of standing issues see Andrew Strauss, Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the 
International Court of Justice in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National and International 
Approaches, (Will C. G. Burns & Hari Osofsky, eds. 2009). 
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(UNFSA).83 A possible pathway to litigation through the UNFSA has been explored by 
Professor Will Burns in a series of articles, culminating in a chapter of a book he co-
edited.84 In Burns’ chapter of this book, “Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change 
Impacts under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement,” he discusses the challenges to 
proving general and specific causation in a potential climate change case between two 
States party to the treaty.85 Burns relates the conclusions of other climate change 
litigation scholars: “establishing legal causation in climate change actions – that is, proving 
that a defendant’s actions caused the harm suffered by a plaintiff – will pose the greatest 
obstacle for a majority of plaintiffs.”86 Burns cites causation problems in unsuccessful 
petitions brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and World 
Heritage Committee. Burns presents an action under UNFSA as a more viable alternative 
to problems with proving general and specific causation that dogged those attempts.87 
Primarily, the reason the UNFSA is so attractive is that large emitter States are party to 
the treaty and actions under the UNFSA have binding force under the UNCLOS regime 
described above. 
                                                
83 Aug. 4, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37. 
84 Will C. G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts under the United Nations 
Fish Stocks Agreement in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National and International Approaches, 
(Will C. G. Burns & Hari Osofsky, eds. 2009). For articles developing the concepts in this chapter see 
Burns, supra note 3 and Will C. G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts under 
the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2007, at 34. 
85 One of the important positive aspects of bringing a challenge under UNFSA is that both the United 
States and China are party to the agreement. Another is that this treaty has dispute resolution “teeth” to 
enforce its provisions related to protection of the marine environment.  It is therefore a particularly attractive 
international agreement for potential enforcement tied to climate change. Id. at 314-315 citing Note, 
Fisheries: United State Ratifies Agreement on Highly Migratory and Straddling Stocks, 1996 Colo. J. 
Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 78, 80 (1996) and contrasting UNFSA with potential actions under the American 
Convention on the Rights of Man and the World Heritage Convention. 
86 Id. at 326 citing Joseph Smith & David Sherman, Climate Change Litigation 107 (2006). 
87 Id. at 327. 
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Burns defines general causation as, “the causal link ‘between activity and the 
general outcome.”88 Any action under UNFSA would be based on declines on fish stocks 
or shifts in the distribution of stocks.89 These changes could be attributable to a variety of 
factors. A defendant State in a climate change action under the UNFSA would likely claim 
a lack of a causal link between climate change and the degradation of fish stocks sufficient 
to establish liability. Burns believes that a tribunal assessing liability to find a “material 
increase of risk” could use statistical probability analysis This line of reasoning would 
allow for liability based on climate change being a substantial factor to damaged fish 
stocks. Burns cites to a UK asbestos liability case from 2002 to support the notion that a 
court might use this type of causation analysis.90 Here, Burns projects only a possible 
judicial analysis. 
Burns also questions a defense based on a lack of general causation on the grounds 
that the treaty regime’s precautionary principle provides that, “States shall apply the 
precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources 
and preserve the marine environment.”91 Even where there is uncertainty the UNFSA 
provides, “[t]he absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.” Based on this 
treaty language, Burns concludes that, “it can be argued that the Parties [to UNFSA] have 
                                                
88 Id. 
89 Id. For example, Burns cites “overfishing, habitat destruction, or diminution of prey species” as possible 
factors contributing to climate change affected species degradation. 
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an obligation to take action even in the absence of definitive proof of causation.”92 Here he 
skirts the causation issue, arguing that a court applying the strictures of the treaty regime 
in toto would find that the precautionary principle creates a relaxed causation standard. Of 
course, a tribunal may not find this altogether compelling. The precedent of a potential 
recognition of the precautionary principle in other adjudicated contexts would be most 
instructive, but Burns does not provide such precedent. 
Burns considers specific causation to mean, “the causal link between a specific 
activity and a specific damage.”93 The defense that a State may raise in relation to specific 
causation would be that “climate change is caused by a multitude of anthropogenic 
sources, and thus, any specific harm cannot be attributable to a specific Party, even a large 
greenhouse [gas] emitting State such as the United States or China.”94 Burns believes that 
this argument is untenable because 1). it is primarily applicable to parties seeking damages 
and States are unlikely to seek damages in a climate change case and 2). even if the State is 
seeking damages the substantial factor test does not preclude establishment of specific 
causation. Burns’ first proposition is based on a hypothetical wherein a State would be 
asking for the recognition of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, or good faith in 
international law. Burns argues that a State could charge that another State has failed to 
                                                                                                                                            
90 The Fairchild v. Glenhaven ([2002] UKHL 22) case cited by Burns includes case law from Australia 
(March v. E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] 171 CLR 506) and Canada (Snell v Farrell [1990] 2 SCR 
311) which discuss the use of causation standards alternate to the “but for” test. 
91 UNFSA, supra note 10, at art. 6(1). 
92 Burns, supra note 11 at 329. 
93 Id. at 327 citing Richard S.J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, Liability and Compensation for Climate Change 
Damages – A Legal and Economic Assessment, Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change, 
Hamburg University, FNU-9 (2001), http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/working-
papers/adapcap.pdf (last visited May 27, 2010). 
94 Id. At 329. 
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fulfill a UNFSA treaty obligation in good faith and this would preclude a showing of 
specific causation. The substantial factor test argument made by Burns is possibly the 
most interesting of his hypothetical maneuvers. 
Burns makes compelling and innovative arguments for possible ‘work-arounds’ for 
the problem of causation in a climate change case. However, the general standard that U.S. 
and U.K. domestic courts use is the “but for” test, under which a balance of probabilities 
may find that a causal link does not exist. In essence, the question would be, “But for a 
State’s actions or inaction would climate change occur and adversely affect fish stocks?” 
While there is a possibility of the “material increase of risk” analysis prevailing for a 
moving party on the issue of causation, a court using the “but for” test would not find a 
causal link to State action or inaction. The “material increase of risk” standard Burns cites 
is similar to the substantial factor test in U.S. tort law. This test is primarily used when 
two forces each could have caused the total harm and it is not possible to determine which 
force ultimately caused the harm. In such cases the “but for” test cannot be used because 
it would allow all parties to escape liability. This test might not be wholly applicable to 
questions regarding climate change causation because of the scope of forces creating harm 
and the novelty of using the test in an international court. The question here is really 
about which test a tribunal might use and there is little case law in international tribunals 
which give clues as to which standard might be used. 
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C. Applicable International Law 
Burns' analysis of the viability of a successful showing of causation in a climate 
change claim under UNFSA is largely hypothetical and devoid of precedent in 
international law. And for good reason: of the 17 cases adjudicated by ITLOS 10 have 
concerned the release of ships and only one was particularly about pollution of the marine 
environment.95 The ITLOS MOX Plant case that dealt particularly with pollution of the 
marine environment was forestalled and eventually dropped without a full investigation 
by the court of the pollution issue.96 Additionally, the case would likely not have 
produced much of a challenge to causation since it dealt with pollution from a particular 
industrial source, like the pollution source in Trail Smelter. What may be instructive about 
this case for the purposes of a hypothetical climate change action under UNFSA is that 
the tribunal found the case to lack the urgency required for them to intervene. Instead, 
“the Tribunal considered that the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and 
general international law” and deferred to “prudence and caution” in requiring only that 
the two parties cooperate and exchange information.97 This language is illustrative of the 
marine resource jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which have produced weak provisional 
measures at best.98 
                                                
95 See attached, “ITLOS Cases” 
96 The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001), available at 
http://www.itlos.org. The MOX plant case involved proceedings before four different fora, an arbitral 
tribunal under the OSPAR Convention, the ITLOS, an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII to UNCLOS, and 
the European Court of Justice. 
97 Press Release, Order in the Mox Plant Case. Dec. 3, 2001. Available at 
http://www.itlos.org/news/press_release/2001/press_release_62_en.pdf. 
98 The best of these are the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases. Here the Tribunal acknowledged significant 
“scientific uncertainty” regarding the evidence presented, but nonetheless found provisional measures 
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The enunciation of a clear theory of causation in international law is not 
unexpected. Climate change science correlates the causes of climate change with the effects 
and damages that global warming creates. The challenge of bridging the gap between this 
scientific correlation and legal causation is an ongoing mystery to international jurists.99 
As Burns points out, alternative theories of causation such as the “material increase of 
risk” theory, or substantial factor analysis or a type of market share liability analysis may 
provide relief but these theories have gone untested in international fora.100 The 
International Court of Justice has also not enunciated a clear causation standard for 
environmental damage due to climate change. That tribunal’s last environmental law 
decision, the Pulp Mills dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, revolved around the 
issue of adequate environmental impact statements (similar to the action in the MOX Plant 
Case before ITLOS).101 There the ICJ concluded that provisional measures were not 
justified because there was “no imminent threat of irreparable damage.”102 The Court did 
recall its general respect for the environment and “[t]he existence of the general obligation 
of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus 
                                                                                                                                            
justified.  Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan, Aus. v. Japan), paras. 79-90 (Int'l Trib. L. of the 
Sea 1999) (Aug. 27 Order on the Provisional Measures Req.), available at http://www.itlos.org. 
99 “[T]he causation theories used in international law are admittedly not adapted to substitute correlation 
for causation.” Jorge E. Vinuales, Legal Techniques for dealing with Scientific Uncertainty in 
Environmental Law, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 437, 498 (2010). 
100 Id. at 499. Vinuales analogizes a drug manufacturer tort case to illustrate market share liability 
analysis’s applicability to potential climate change litigation. 
101 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Order of July 13, 2006), para. 73 available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/11235.pdf. 
102 Id. at para. 87. 
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of international law relating to the environment.”103 As discussed above, the ICJ is not 
particularly applicable beyond general statements of international obligation when 
searching for a solid causation standard for international environmental law in general and 
in the climate change context specifically. 
Conclusions on International Environmental Torts 
 
The international judicial framework is a rich combination of institutions that 
provide coverage for an array of human activity. However, the lack of a court dedicated to 
environmental matters is increasingly problematic. In keeping with the framework of a 
tripartite conception of justice, an environmental court would need to focus on corrective 
justice and retributive justice to be successful. Environmental harm may be both 
intentional, as in the case of environmental warfare, and the serious consequence of 
negligent conduct, as in the case of climate change. Both of these types of harm are 
challenges for an international community that values peace and equity. Often those living 
already fragile lives are most effected by environmental harm, be they refugees in a war 
torn area or indigenous people struggling to maintain their direct connection to the land. 
Providing justice for these people will require international institutions tailored to the 
necessary job of attacking climate change and creating the mechanisms that will protect 
the earth and all of its inhabitants from future environmental harm. 
Potential actors moving to bring climate change actions in international fora will 
likely need to present multiple avenues for proving causation. The scientific uncertainty 
                                                
103 Id. at para. 72 citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
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that plagues the establishment of both general and specific causation of damages 
attributable to climate change under UNCLOS or another current treaty regime will need 
to be addressed thoroughly. Domestic tort law theories of causation may be helpful when 
developing a case aimed at an existing international forum. However, a new court would 
undoubtedly be shaped around issues of causation in international environmental law. 
This would provide potential defendants and plaintiffs with a clear standard for causation 
in the case of environmental harm, which is currently lacking under international law. 
                                                                                                                                            
Reports 1996 (I), pp. 241-242, para. 29; and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. 
Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 140. 
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Chapter Three: International Environmental Crime: Ecocide 
 
ecocide n. destruction or damage of the environment, esp. when reckless or 
intentional; an instance of this.104 
 
Ecological damage may be of sufficient scale and scope that it creates conditions 
that threaten the continued existence of a people. When this environmental destruction is 
anthropogenic it clearly constitutes an injustice perpetrated against the suffering 
population. This environmental harm most often stems from the use of environmentally 
destructive weaponry, the destruction of natural resources, and the loss of land use from 
contamination or destruction. Such environmental harm plagues communities around the 
world. For example, campesinos in Colombia have argued that U.S. government-sponsored 
crop dusting engaged in with the aim of eradicating coca and opium crops as part of the 
“war on drugs” has created detrimental human health effects and environmental damage 
that threaten not only their health, but their food crops, livestock, and ability to remain in 
their homes.105 Another ongoing example of environmental harm comes in the form of 
                                                
104 "ecocide, n." OED Online. Dec. 2009. Oxford University Press. 6 May 2010 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50071979>. The etymological notes from the OED cite historic uses 
of the term, “1969 Encycl. Sci. Suppl. (Grolier) 159 Discarded automobiles, old newspapers and telephone 
books, tin cans, nonreturnable bottles all add to the growing problems of solid-waste disposal... *Ecocide 
the murder of the environment is everybody's business. 1982 New Scientist 3 June 663/1 Olof Palme 
denounced the Americans for ecocide in Vietnam. 2003 P. HERVIK Mayan People iii. 74 The national and 
international media presented the wildfire as an ecocide, since many species became extinct because of the 
milpa making that includes burning patches for cultivation.” By contrast, the term, “geocide” has not made 
it into standard English dictionaries. 
105 Several news reports have published the concerns of the inhabitants of areas regularly sprayed since the 
program began in earnest in the late 1990s. The ongoing program, Plan Colombia, has been criticized by 
NGOs, the government of Ecuador and a domestic Colombian court. See Chris Kraul, “Drug War” in 
Colombia: Echoes of Vietnam, Rachel Massey, 22 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 280 (2001) and “Getting high on 
the war on drugs,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 2009 A1.  The Colombian and U.S. government 
maintain that the glyphosate used to dust crops are not substantially toxic to humans or livestock. A report 
commissioned by the two governments concluded that current practices for growing illicit coca and opium 
crops in Colombia are more environmentally destructive than the crop dusting itself. See Keith R 
Solomon, et al., Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and 
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large oil spills arising from military, paramilitary and negligent action or omissions. Four 
million gallons of oil entered the Mediterranean Sea after Israel bombed Lebanese fuel 
tanks during a 2006 blockade of that country which has resulted in continuing ecological 
and economic damage.106 Oil spills originating in Nigeria, which are likely the result of 
militant activity, have exacerbated the negligence, if not outright intentional devastation, 
perpetrated by a host of multinational oil companies in the Niger River Delta - one of the 
most severely oil polluted areas in the world.107 Each of these examples involves actors 
and victims from different States and burdens carried across State borders. Each of these 
examples involves environmental degradation that potentially destroys ecosystems that 
human populations depend on for survival. These examples of international environmental 
destruction illustrate the urgent need to protect ecosystems from severe environmental 
harm. 
Intentional acts that seek to harm populations through ecological destruction and 
unintentional acts that have the effect of harming populations through ecological 
destruction must both be subject to legal processes to help ensure that these activities are 
halted if ongoing, deterred from commencing and remedied through compensatory and 
injunctive relief. When the cause of such damage originates within the borders of one State 
and harms the population in another State the legal process is necessarily international. As 
                                                                                                                                            
Poppy Control in Colombia, Washington, DC, USA: Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(CICAD) section of the Organization of American States (OAS). 121. 
106 See, Matthew L. Tucker, Mitigating Collateral Damage to the Natural Environment in Naval Warfare: 
An Examination of the Israeli Naval Blockade of 2006, 57 Naval L. Rev. 161 (2009). 
107 See, James Donnelly-Saalfield, Irreparable Harms: How the Devastating Effects of Oil Extraction in 
Nigeria have not been Remedied by Nigerian Courts, the African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 




noted before, since the conclusion of the Trail Smelter Arbitration in 1941 the principle of 
State liability for transboundary harm has been firmly set in international law.108 Many 
commentators and advocates have called for the creation of an international tribunal to 
hear claims based on transboundary environmental harm.109 This chapter aims to add to 
that discussion by focusing on a potential cause of action in such a tribunal: ecocide. 
International law provides norms and institutions that aim to address threats such 
as these. However, legal mechanisms for application of norms have fallen short at 
providing necessary protections. Current international criminal law, codified in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, recognizes that domestic protections are 
insufficient to deal with the challenges posed by environmental aggression, which is of 
such severity and scope that it constitutes a war crime.110 Still, there are discrete problems 
with the possibility of prosecutions for war crimes that involve environmental 
destruction, leaving the question open whether the current formulation of environmental 
                                                
108 The arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter Case found that, “under the principles of international law ... 
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes 
in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence 
and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 
1905, 1907 (Arb. Trib. 1941). This principle has been ratified in the International Court of Justice. 
109 See, e.g., Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Recognizing Global Environmental Interests: A Universal Standing 
Treaty for Environmental Degradation,  22 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2009) citing Sean D. Murphy, 
Conference on International Environmental Dispute Resolutions: Does the World Need a New 
International Environmental Court?, 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 333 (2000); Kenneth F. 
McCallion & H. Rajan Sharma, Conference on International Environmental Dispute Resolutions: 
Environmental Justice Without Borders: The Need For an International Court of the Environment to 
Protect Fundamental Environmental Rights, 32 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. & Econ. 351 (2000); Audra E. 
Dehan, An International Environmental Court: Should There Be One?, 3 Touro J. Transnat’l L. 31 
(1992); Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law on the Environment and Setting Up an 
International Court for the Environment Within the United Nations, 20 Envtl. L. 321 (1990). 
110 Section 8(2)(b)iv  of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides the standard” For 
the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: Other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, 
any of the following acts: Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct overall military advantage anticipated;”. 
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war crimes is impotent to protect those affected by ecocidal acts.111 Moreover, 
environmental destruction stemming from human actors is perpetrated both during times 
of war and times of peace. At different moments over the last half-century the term 
ecocide has been used to describe different facets of a central problem: human destruction 
of ecosystems that support human life. This chapter attempts to provide the parameters 
for a functional legal definition for ecocide based on the concept’s history, the ongoing 
need for a recognized international crime, and the feasibility of such a cause of action’s 
acceptance in the discipline of international law. 
Although the term ecocide has found its way into major dictionaries and exists in a 
corner of the literature on international environmental law, the definition from the OED 
above illustrates that the word now enjoys such a broad formulation that the term has 
been rhetorically neutralized. An example of the breadth of definition that the term now 
suffers from is found in the writings of British lawyer and environmental activist, Polly 
Higgins. Higgins advocates for “ecocide” becoming the “5th crime against peace.” While 
the goal of her media campaign, comprising a book, website and many speaking 
engagements, is laudable, the definition that she uses is over broad and the reliance on 
slotting it into the framework of current humanitarian law misses the mark.112 When 
                                                
111 Jessica C. Lawrence & Kevin J. Heller, The First Ecocentric Environmental War Crime: The Limits of 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 61, 61 (2007). 
112 The definition Polly Higgins has proffered is, “ecocide: the extensive destruction, damage to or loss of 
ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that 
peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory have been severely diminished.” 
http://www.thisisecocide.com, Eradicating Ecocide, Chapter 5. While many of the goals of this article 
coincide with Higgins’s, namely an argument for the use of international legal mechanisms to stem 
ecological destruction, this author finds her arguments problematic and solutions inappropriate. Many of 
the ideas are conflations of concepts (e.g. environmental damage and climate change), misunderstandings or 
unfounded premises of international law (e.g. a definition of “inhabitants) and suspect analysis (e.g. an 
analysis of strict liability in the environmental context only when called for). The focus of Higgins’s work 
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Shakespeare wrote, “ . . . many wearing rapiers are afraid of goosequills,” he could have 
been referring to his own vocabulary, which has been sufficient to inspire awe for over 
four hundred years.113 Without questioning the power of words to inspire, it is fair to say 
that a legal term of art devoid of meaning, or one with a meaning attempted to be imbued 
with panacea-like qualities, becomes ineffective - prostrate under its own weight.  
The term “genocide,” coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin, gained prominence when 
it was considered during the Nuremburg trials.114 The concept and term were 
subsequently taken up by multiple governments at the United Nations and given legal 
substance through international processes.115  If a charge of ecocide is to have meaning and 
utility it should be enacted through an international institutional process that includes 
stakeholders most affected by ecological harm. It should be tailored to fit its rhetorical 
power in relation to genocide and its historical development stemming from military 
atrocities. It should deal with environmental harm so detrimental to human populations 
that it threatens their continued existence. 
This chapter discusses the development of the term ecocide and its application to 
detrimental harm suffered by communities in Vietnam, Iraq, and Ecuador. These three 
examples of ecocide illuminate three different ways in which the destruction of 
ecosystems has threatened the survival of targeted groups. The first example, perpetrated 
                                                                                                                                            
on punishment is also problematic, which has been criticized by commentators on the International 
Criminal Court, into which Higgins would like to slot her concept of “ecocide.” See, e.g.,  
113 The quotation comes from Hamlet, Act 2, scene II.  
114 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress 90 (1944). 
115 For a discussion of the genesis of the legal term “genocide” and it’s use in international fora see, 
William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 J. of 
Int’l Crim. Just. 39, 41-42 (2003). 
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against Vietnamese populations during the international war of aggression waged by the 
U.S. Government, is a case of intentional ecocide waged by one State against the 
population of another. The second example, inflicted upon the Marsh Arabs in Iraq by the 
Saddam Hussein regime, is a case of intentional ecocide waged against a discrete domestic 
population by their own government. The third example is offered as a case of reckless or 
negligent ecocide committed against indigenous populations in Ecuador by private 
international actors. 
This chapter advocates for a definition for ecocide based on the history of the 
term, the need it serves and the bounds of international law. The conclusions and analysis 
throughout these sections aim to support the multiple proposals for international 
environmental tribunals while keeping the potential for retributive justice for those 
directly harmed central to the analysis.  This discussion of a legal definition of ecocide 
follows first the proposals of Richard Falk in relation to the Vietnam War. Following this, 
the writings on ecocide by legal scholars, in particular Mark Drumbl, are considered. 
The Roots of Ecocide 
 
The origins of the term ecocide can be traced to the peace movement of the 1960s 
when ecological destruction was recognized as an overt tool of war.116 In reference to the 
war in Vietnam, the New Left socialist Herbert Marcuse wrote, 
                                                
116 The first use of the term is surely older than in the usage of the authors cited here. For example, the term 
was used by an international relations scholar as a title to an article in a popular journal that does not bring 
up the term within the body of its text one year before the Marcuse article referenced below. L. Craig 
Johnston. Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol. 49 Foreign Aff. 4, 711 1971. This would seem to illustrate 
that the term was widely known at the time, although a search of the publications archives did not show 
any other use of the term in the publication's history. (searched 05/11/10). 
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The violation of the earth is a vital aspect of the counterrevolution. The 
genocidal war against people is also “ecocide” insofar as it attacks the 
sources and resources of life itself. It is no longer enough to do away with 
people living now; life must also be denied to those who aren't even born 
yet by burning and poisoning the earth, defoliating the trees, blowing up 
the dikes.117 
 
Although, ecological damage has been a form of warfare since the beginning of recorded 
history, the scope and severity of the United States Government's ecological warfare 
during the war in Vietnam laid the basis for the term’s use to describe various modern 
instances of environmental destruction. 118 
Surveying the literature on ecocide brings multiple conceptions of the term. Some 
have tied the term directly to the attacks on indigenous peoples.119  The term has also 
been used to describe the environmental impact on decline of the Soviet Union.120 The 
                                                
117 Herbert Marcuse, “Ecology and Revolution,” in 16 Liberation 10 (Sept. 1972), reprinted in 
Introduction to Ecology: Key Concepts in Critical Theory 1, 52 (Carolyn Merchant ed., Prometheus 
Books 1999). 
118 See for example, Drumbl (1998). Drumbl cites Roman soldiers salting the soil of Carthage and the 
World War II German scorched earth policy along with more recent environmental warfare techniques. 
Also, “Since time immemorial, war has visited its excesses on nature, excesses that many fear the Earth 
can no longer tolerate. From ancient times to modern, the environment has been used as a weapon and as a 
target of war. For instance, the Spartans salted Athenian fields during the Peloponnesian War. The Dutch 
opened dikes to create a water barrier (the “Dutch Water Line” of 1672) to halt the French in the Third 
Anglo-Dutch War. Both sides burned huge expanses of the veldt during the Boer War. Verdun was 
emaciated by artillery and poisoned with gas during World War I. A horrific loss of life and widespread 
devastation occurred when the Chinese dynamited the Huayuankow dike on the Yellow River during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War (1938). The United States extensively seeded clouds over the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail and defoliated large jungle tracts during the Vietnam War. Another chilling example is the 
contamination of Scotland's Gruinard Island during Britain's Anthrax testing in 1942; the island remains 
uninhabitable today. If environmental damage during armed conflict is not restrained, the armed forces that 
are intended to protect us from harm may become the agents of our ultimate destruction.” Rymn James 
Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, “Greenkeeping,” and Enforcement of the Law 
Pertaining to Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 441, 441 
(1998). 
119 Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide and 
Colonization (2d ed. 1999). 
120 Murray Feshbach & Alfred Friendly, Jr., Facing Facts, in Ecocide of the USSR: Health and Nature 
Under Siege 1 (1992). “When historians finally conduct an autopsy of the Soviet Union and Soviet 
Communism, they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide. . .. No other great industrial civilization so 
systematically and so long poisoned its land, air, water and people. None so loudly proclaiming its efforts 
to improve public health and protect nature so degraded both. And no advanced society faced such a bleak 
political and economic reckoning with so few resources to invest toward recovery. The Soviet Union was 
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idea has been proffered by some as a necessary step in addressing the ecological effects of 
war.121 Ecocide also has a more ecocentric formulation, wherein the term focuses on the 
destruction of ecosystems, independent of effects on humans.122 Most recently the term 
has been used to connect resource exploitation with the global climate change 
movement.123 The term has variant meanings, and it is important to recognize the different 
strains of thought that flow from the way that ecocide is defined. Here the focus is on 
“ecocide” as a crime and the prospect of codifying it clearly in international law. 
Two of the periods of military action that have included environmental destruction 
at such a scale and ferocity that the word ecocide is often used to describe them are the 
Vietnam War and the Gulf War in Iraq. These two periods of military aggression captured 
the world's attention and from the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam to the burning of oil 
fields in Iraq, images of ecological disaster are familiar to many. However, the 
international community has much to learn from the experiences of those affected by 
ecological destruction from both of these affronts to peace. Much of the focus on Agent 
Orange is placed on the effects on American veterans. Similarly, much of the focus on the 
Gulf War atrocities failed to take into account attendant effects on populations in that 
country. Particularly, the ecological effects on marginalized populations went without 
notice outside of academia. It may be that “such activity remains permissible because 
there is no definitive or readily enforceable code of conduct governing what warring 
                                                                                                                                            
mired in shocking environmental catastrophe at every level of society. The effects of the Chernobyl debacle 
and the Aral Sea tragedy are still unfolding, and serve as powerful iconography for the cornucopia of 
pollution, disease and environmental degradation that is a hallmark of autocratic regimes.” 
121 Nada Al-Duaij. Environmental Law of Armed Conflict. p. 412 
122 Franz J. Broswimmer, Ecocide: A Short History of the Mass Extinction of Species 1 (2002) 
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parties can and cannot do to the environment.”124 By showcasing ecological harm on the 
stage of international law and relations and establishing definitive codes of conduct vis-à-
vis the environment, this destruction may be partly averted. 
A. Vietnam: International Environmental Warfare 
In 1973, one year after Marcuse wrote on ecocide, Richard Falk wrote the article 
discussed above detailing the ecological atrocities committed by the U.S. government 
during the Vietnam War.125 As described above, the U.S. campaign of environmental 
destruction deforested large areas and adversely affected the South Asian population 
dependent on the ecosystems in these areas. However, such actions were not contained to 
forestland. Particularly disastrous for civilian populations were chemical herbicide attacks 
that targeted cropland.126  
The U.S. military strategies in Vietnam were based on “the basic rationale of 
separating the people from their land and its life supporting characteristics.”127 Other 
tactics, such as indiscriminate bombing and weather manipulation were also part of this 
campaign. One of the ways that the U.S. government decided to accomplish this goal was 
through the use of the chemical herbicide Agent Orange. The horrors of the after-effects of 
the use of Agent Orange are the most glaringly inhumane of the biological effects that 
civilians suffered from this campaign. The birth defects and continuing health effects 
                                                                                                                                            
123 See This is Ecocide http://www.thisisecocide.com/. 
124 Drumbl, 1998 at 123. 
125 Falk, (1973) supra. 
126 For example, “The use of chemical herbicides to destroy crops destined for civilian consumption is one 
of the points where the allegations of ecocide merge with allegations of genocide. Id. at 87. 
127 Falk at 80. 
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associated with exposure to dioxin, found in Agent Orange, are well documented.128 At the 
time of the writing of Falk’s piece, the United States had modulated some of its 
environmental warfare techniques from chemical weaponry to industrial machinery to 
clear vast tracts of forestland. However, it had not abandoned its project of ecological 
destruction. This campaign raged on for many years and consumed vast amounts of forest 
and cropland. This policy laid the foundation for international concern for the use of 
ecological destruction in modern warfare to accomplish military goals. 
B. Iraq: Civil Environmental Warfare 
The documented brutality inflicted upon the land and people of Vietnam were 
instances of the aggression of an outside military force during armed conflict. There are 
other instances of severe environmental harm that occur during the stresses and strains of 
war. Actions by the Hussein regime in Iraq in the 1990s provide multiple examples of 
actions considered to amount to ecocide by legal scholars. These actions included the 
setting fire to 600 of Kuwait’s oil wells in the first Gulf War and deliberately discharging 
at least six million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf.129 The following is a short 
discussion of a third ecological atrocity perpetrated by the Hussein regime. After the 
unsuccessful Shiite rebellion of 1991, the Hussein government drained the marshlands of 
                                                
128 The birth defects and continuing health effects associated with exposure to dioxin, found in the herbicide 
Agent Orange, are well documented, but outside of the scope of this article. The United States government 
does recognize that U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War have continuing health problems associated with 
exposure. See Agent Orange - Herbicide Exposure, http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/benefits/Herbicide/ (last 
visited 05/12/10). 
129 Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and 
Environmental Damage in Non-International Conflicts, 15 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1, 1 (2004). 
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Southern Iraq, successfully destroying the lifestyle and culture of the Shiite Ma’Dan, or 
Marsh Arab.130 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the use or citing of the term ecocide in legal scholarship 
spiked after the actions of the Hussein regime.131 Most authors cited the first two 
examples of ecological destruction and connected the term to the line of reasoning 
regarding international norms of humanitarian law. Few authors have dealt explicitly and 
fully with the attacks on the Shiite Ma'Dan. While recognizing the significance of the 
burning of the oil wells and discharging of oil into the Persian Gulf, these authors have 
expanded the use of ecocide outside of the State-on-State hostility paradigm. In contrast 
to the paradigm of the ecological atrocities of the Vietnam War, “while the American 
campaign was intended to facilitate military maneuvers, the draining of the Iraqi wetlands 
was a deliberate effort to eradicate the Marsh Arabs and their culture by altering the 
environment upon which they and their culture depended.”132 In reviewing the scholarship 
focused on the plight of the Marsh Arabs, a picture of ecocide as a possible cause of 
action embracing the character of human rights law more fully begins to emerge. 
The marshes of Southern Mesopotamia were once the region’s largest wetlands. 
The people who lived in this region of Iraq developed a culture in which they existed “in 
                                                
130 Id. 
131 For examples of articles referencing both 'ecocide' and the environmental damage perpetrated during the 
Gulf War see, Okorodudu-Fubara (1991);William Beardslee, International Law & the Environment: The 
Need for an Aggregate Organization, 5 J. Int'l L. & Prac. 379 (1996); James S. Robbins, War Crimes: 
The Case of Iraq,  18-FALL Fletcher F. World Aff. 45 (1994); Schmitt (1997); Timothy Schofield, The 
Environment as an Ideological Weapon: A Proposal to Criminalize Environmental Terrorism, 26 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 619 (1999); Peter Sharp, Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International 
Criminal Court, 18 Va. Envtl. L.J. 217 (1999); Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, 
Jus Cogens and Protections of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms, 11 
Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 101 (1998);   Yuzon (1996). 
132 Schwabach at 7. 
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harmony with the marsh environment.” 133 For hundreds of years, the Marsh Arabs were 
“completely dependent on marsh resources: the plants, animals and water of the marshes . 
. . [t]he reeds that grew in the marshes were the primary building material for houses and 
boats; the fish and waterfowl of the marshes were a primary source of food.134 However, 
claims charging the Hussein regime envisioned under the Genocide Convention, Hague and 
Geneva Regimes, Human Rights Covenants, and specific environmental treaties were not 
considered possible and were met with considerable cynicism.135 Protections espoused in 
Human Rights Covenants136 are problematic in that they afford protections only when 
those who are harmed may be collectively defined as a “people”.137 While, environmental 
treaties are generally too focused on harms to the environment instead of or without 
enough attention paid to the humans who may rely directly on attacked ecosystems. 138 
The programs of the Iraqi government moved from disruptions of the marsh 
ecosystem to targeted military attacks on Marsh Arab populations in a process of 
ecocide.139 “From an ecocide perspective, draining the Marshlands deprived indigenous 
people of their homes and livelihood, damaged the ecosystem, and destroyed the Marsh 
Arab culture. Saddam deliberately destroyed the ecosystem with the intent to kill people 
                                                
133 Id. at 3. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 8. 
136 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. &  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 386. 
137 Schwabach at 12. 
138 Id. at 15. 
139 Briefly, the history that Al Moumin outlines is, “Saddam's regime forces put down [an] uprising, 
killing between 30,000 and 60,000 people in the process. . . . Next, Saddam's regime began large-scale 
hydro-engineering projects in the marshes. . . . [followed by the] arrest, detention, torture, summary 
execution, as well as military operations such as poisoning and napalming the local population and the 
Marshlands.” Id. at 507-508. 
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because of their belonging to a certain religious division.”140 The Hussein regime had an 
explicit policy against the Marsh Arabs.141 This shows an intentionality to kill the 
members of the group through ecological destruction.142 In order for actions such as these 
to be potentially deterred by the force of international law, it seems that universal 
environmental rights would need to be recognized in a multilateral convention 
C. Ecuador: Private Environmental Warfare 
There may also be factual arguments for extending a potential definition of ecocide 
outside of the context of armed aggression. Where ecological resources of a community 
have been destroyed through the actions of an international commercial actor, the willful 
or grossly negligent destruction of the environment may cause grave harm to populations. 
An international criminal cause of action may be one way to allow for guilty parties to be 
recognized. In one such case the U.S. corporation Texaco presided over a massive 
environmental detriment after it contracted with the Ecuadorian government to extract oil 
from the land of its indigenous population.  
The first U.S. legal academic to expose the harm done in Ecuador was Professor 
Judith Kimerling. She has chronicled the transgressions of the multinational oil company 
and presented a startling picture of the harm done to the indigenous peoples who have 
                                                
140 Id. at 509. 
141 For example, when discussing the ongoing efforts to re-inundate the illegally drained marshlands, Al 
Moumin recognizes the importance of international assistance, but States, “More troubling is the lack of 
Marsh Arab involvement in the rehabilitation process. The Marsh Arabs are the real stakeholders and, thus, 
are very eager to commit their time and expertise, including valuable geographical knowledge, to 
restoration projects that will help them to return to their original way of life.”  Mishkat Al Moumin, 
Mesopotamian Marshlands: An Ecocide Case, 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 499, 502 (2008). 
142 “Environmental injustice involves taking an indirect action that puts people of a certain race, religion, 
or culture at higher risk by polluting their environment. Ecocide is about taking a direct action to kill a 
group of a certain race, religion, or culture by destroying their ecosystem completely. Ecocide involves the 
60 
 
subsisted on the rain forest ecosystem that Texaco contaminated. For example, “[i]n 
addition to routine, willful discharges and emissions, Texaco spilled nearly twice as much 
oil as the Exxon Valdez from the main pipeline alone, mostly in the Amazon basin.”143 
The actions that Texaco perpetrated against the indigenous people of Ecuador have had 
lasting implications for the health of individuals and the cultures of this population.  
American and Ecuadorian lawyers, alerted by Kimerling’s scholarship and their 
own personal connections to the ongoing environmental degradation, brought a U.S. suit 
against Texaco in 1993. Chevron inherited the case in 2001 when it merged with Texaco 
and was successful in an action to remove the case from U.S. courts to Ecuador. This case 
has garnered much media attention, but has failed to provide the indigenous Ecuadorian 
peoples with redress.144 The case has highlighted the inability of indigenous peoples to 
receive compensation in domestic courts for the serious detriments they have endured 
through what many believe amounts to criminal activity of international corporations. The 
factual lesson one might take from the Ecuadorian example is that resource extraction may 
be carried out in places where those most affected have little economic or political power 
without the threat of any economic resolution for suffering populations. If this model of 
                                                                                                                                            
intent to kill the people of certain race, religion, or culture, whereas the concept of environmental injustice 
does not involve an intent to kill.” Id. at 506. 
143 Judith Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: Chevron, Texaco and Indigenous 
Huaorani and Kichwa in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 445, 458. (2007). In 
one disconcerting passage Kimerling relates an interaction she had with a Ecuadorian oil worker who told 
her, “Three years ago, I went to a training course . . . and a gringo from Texaco told us that oil nourishes 
the brain and retards aging. He said that in the United States they do this on all of the roads, and people 
there are very intelligent.” It is not difficult to imagine such evidence as part of a claim of ecocide. 
Kimerling has been working on the ground with indigenous populations in Ecuador since 1989. Her 1991 
book Amazon Crude was the first in depth study of the damage done to the Ecuadorian Amazon. 
144 See e.g. Berlinger, J. Director. (2009). Crude: The Real Price of Oil [Film] New York: Entendre Films. 
The Ecuadorian case was ultimately decided in favor of the indigenous plaintiffs, but Chevron has no assets 
in Ecuador and has not, to date, voluntarily paid any of the 9 billion dollar ruling. 
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international environmental governance is the de facto rule of law, the international 
community will have failed to protect its most vulnerable members and provided the stage 
for intensive economic waste that threatens us all. The aforementioned problems with oil 
extraction in Nigeria provide another example of this type of resource waste and 
destructive business practices that are ongoing and severe. 
Toward a New Formulation of Ecocide 
 
There is growing support for formulating a cause of action in international law that 
would cover the polluting practices of any actor, national or private in character. The 
following discussion aims to present some of the scholarship on “ecocide” to frame a 
potential cause of action that might be incorporated into a potential IEC. These scholars  
A. Richard Falk: Genesis of an Idea 
Falk's article is the seminal piece of scholarship on ecocide, discussing the use and 
validity of environmental warfare in Vietnam. Falk concludes his article with concrete 
proposals for taking action to create a convention on environmental warfare. Various 
authors who have undertaken the challenge of fashioning a useful definition of ecocide and 
a path for its functional implementation in international law have cited his proposals.145 
                                                
145 Avi Brisman, Crime-Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice, 6 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 
727 (2008); Carl E. Bruch, All's not Fair in (Civil) War: Cirminal Liability for Environmental Damage 
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Okorodudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian Gulf: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 St. Mary's 
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Richards and Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment During Armed 
Conflict, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 1047 (1999); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the 
Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (1997); Stefanie N. Simonds, 
Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 
Stan. J. Int'l L. 165 (1992); Ludwik A. Teclaff, Beyond Restoration – The Case of Ecocide, 34 Nat. 
Resources J. 933 (1994); Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: 
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Falk's article anchors his discussion of environmental warfare in tenets of 
customary international law that cover “any belligerent conduct not specifically covered 
by valid treaty rule.”146 These are the well-recognized principles of necessity, humanity, 
proportionality, and discrimination: 
- Principle of necessity. No tactic or weapon may be employed in war that 
inflicts superfluous suffering on its victims, even if used in the pursuit of 
an otherwise military objective; 
- Principle of humanity. No tactic or weapon may be employed in war that 
is inherently cruel and offends minimum and wisely shared moral 
sensibilities; 
- Principle of proportionality. No weapon or tactic may be employed in 
war that inflicts death, injury, and destruction disproportionate to its 
contribution to the pursuit of lawful military objectives; 
- Principle of discrimination No weapon or tactic may be employed in war 
that fails to discriminate between military and non-military targets and that 
is either inherently or in practice  incapable of discriminating between 
combatants and noncombatants.147 
 
Falk framed the ongoing atrocities in Vietnam under the above tenets of 
international law. Although without the treaty framework Falk proposed, the tactics of 
environmental warfare were not violative of agreements to which the United States was 
bound. Only cold comfort may have been had in the notion that customary international 
law of war applied to the U.S. government's actions. This customary law was at least a 
moral indictment of the continuing environmental destruction that ultimately targeted 
human life, but little more. 
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Falk makes a legal distinction between “weapons and tactics that are designed to 
damage the environment and those that, like bombs, are designed to strike human or 
societal targets but which may also, as a side effect, damage the environment.”148 This 
distinction is important in a couple of different ways for the development of a definition 
of ecocide that is useful under international law. First, when considering what constitutes 
ecocide (and beyond a working definition, one that becomes politically palatable) the issue 
of the intent of potentially responsible parties becomes important. Intent underlies the 
principles of customary international law governing proper conduct during war listed 
above. Moreover, the distinction Falk raises are central to defining ecocide beyond 
wartime actions. Falk distinguishes between what might be termed ecocide (acts 
culminating in intended ecological destruction) and those to be considered ecocidal (acts 
that incidentally destroy the natural environment). Such a distinction is important when 
framing the scope of those potentially liable. Without those actions that are in effect 
ecocidal being codified as amounting to ecocide the idea of an ecocide convention remains 
firmly within the realm of the laws of war. Primarily, these distinctions create a class of 
actions that might be covered by customary international law (those intended) and a class 
that are not. Subsequent scholars, discussed herein, explore this distinction and have 
expanded the notion of ecocide that Falk eloquently presented. 
To flesh out these humanitarian challenges, Falk catalogues the specific actions of 
the U.S. Government in Vietnam that he recognizes as amounting to ecocide and looks at 
their legal rationale and then makes his own legal appraisals. On the basis of humanitarian 
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principles, Falk finds that the environmental warfare then occurring in Vietnam amounted 
to war crimes under international law. However, Falk recognized that under the prevailing 
international system, wherein the United States was one of two Cold War superpowers, it 
could effectively block any inquiry into its conduct in Vietnam. 
Falk's analysis is thoroughly rooted in his own “historical moment,” which he 
describes as when the world was “in the process of discovering the extent to which man’s 
normal activities are destroying the ecological basis of life on the planet.” 149 He wonders 
as to why at that moment humans “should also be confronted by this extraordinary 
enterprise of deliberate environmental destruction in Indo-china.”150 Falk also centered 
those most affected by ecological warfare in his analysis. Falk foreshadowed the language 
of others who describe the ecological attack of the developed States on least developed 
countries, declaring, “The target of environmental warfare is the Third World.”151  His 
analysis and basic proposal for an ecocide convention is the basis for the other work that I 
review below. 
B. A Scholarly Mini-Movement: The scholarship on Ecocide in the 1990’s 
Multiple international law scholars undertook the topic of severe environmental 
degradation during the last decade of the 20th century. During this period the International 
Law Commission (ILC) finalized a decades-long project to codify international crimes 
completing substantial work on a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind. The UN General Assembly had tasked the ILC with creating such a code as far 
                                                




back as 1954, in conjunction with the ILC’s work creating the Nuremberg Charter used to 
guide the prosecution of individuals at the Nuremberg Trials. In 1991 the provisional draft 
Code consisted of 12 international crimes, including “willful and sever damage to the 
environment.” This provision, along with 5 other of the original 12 crimes, of the Draft 
Code proved to be contentious among UN member States. In 1996, the ILC established a 
Working Group to “examine the possibility of covering in the draft code the issue of 
willful and severe damage to the environment.”152 That Working Group “proposed to the 
Commission that this crime be considered as a war crime, a crime against humanity or a 
separate crime against the peace and security of mankind. The Commission voted to refer 
to the Drafting Committee only the text prepared by the Working Group for inclusion of 
willful and severe damage to the environment as a war crime.”153 In the same 1996 ILC 
session the Commission adopted the final text of the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace 
and Security of Mankind with 20 articles. Article 20 - War Crimes, reads: 
Any of the following war crimes constitutes a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind when committed in a systematic manner or on a large 
scale: (g) In the case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare 
not justified by military necessity with the intent to cause widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby 
gravely prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage 
occurs.154 
 
The 1996 Draft Code laid the basis for the 1999 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court discussed above, which includes the Article 8 prohibition of “intentionally 
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launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”155  It may have seemed 
that as the world moved into the 21st century the crime of ecocide was recognized and 
established in international law. However, as discussed here, the environmental provision 
has not proven to be actionable, even though potentially intentional severe damage to the 
natural environment in the context of war has taken place. Further, it seems clear that the 
international law here referencing environmental degradation is firmly set only within the 
context of wartime activities. 
International legal scholars writing at the same time that the ILC and UN was 
undertaking their work pushed for the codification of ecocide such that it would 
encompass activities outside of the context of war. Each considered transboundary harm 
itself as an international delict, relying on the development of international environmental 
law. One scholar argued for categorizing all transboundary environmental harm, as an 
international crime when the harm is “massive.”156 For example, the threat of large oil 
spills and nuclear incidents arising out of peacetime activities may constitute “ecocide.”157 
This view of ecocide would allow for it to be recognized as an international delict not 
requiring the assigning of fault, becoming a strict liability “supertort.”158 Such a 
formulation of what constitutes “ecocide” brings it out of the context of wartime activity, 
but in so doing the concept arguably loses the focus on direct human impact that Falk 
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advocated.159 This formulation of the term might be seen as less anthropocentric both in 
the impacts of the action and the intentionality of perpetrators. It is unclear whether this 
might make ecocide more politically palatable. Still, such a view of what constitutes 
ecocide is a significant step toward an argument for a new international cause of action. 
Reliance on the scale of ecological impact, rather than on notions of intentionality, loss of 
life, or other factors that subsequent authors have used to shape the concept of ecocide 
provides part of the picture of a potential future international crime. 
Another scholar, agreeing with the view that ecocide occurs when “States, and 
arguably individuals and organizations, causing or permitting harm to the natural 
environment on a massive scale breach a duty of care owed to humanity in general and 
therefore commit an international delict,” also investigated the potential of ecocide to rise 
to the level of an international crime.160  While not convinced that ecocide at that time rose 
to the level of an international crime under international law, it was clear that “ecocide in 
its entirety resembles accepted international crimes in important ways and therefore 
could, and perhaps eventually will, be accorded that status.”161 Following these important 
steps in the development of ecocide, international legal scholar Mark Drumbl extensively 
investigated the dimensions of severe international environmental harm that bring it into 
the realm of an international crime. 
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C. Mark Drumbl: Elaboration in a New International Order 
Professor Mark A. Drumbl thoroughly addresses the use of the term ecocide to 
describe an international crime that the international legal community might utilize to deal 
with severe environmental harms. Drumbl’s discussion of ecocide transforms it from a 
term of art used to describe a phenomenon to a cause of action that could provide the 
backbone for a new international convention. Falk called for this in reference to 
environmental warfare twenty-five years earlier, but Drumbl is writing with a broader 
scope of environmental degradation in mind and in an era that has seen much development 
of international law. 
Although there was development in international environmental law between the 
1970s and 1990s, as shown above, Drumbl declares that “[a]ll that the international 
community has been able to negotiate is scattered collateral references in a variety of 
treaties and conventions.” As discussed in the previous chapter, Drumbl disposes of the 
Rome Statute as a weak alternative for prosecution. Thereafter in his analysis, he moves 
on to developing the case for an ecocide convention that could address the needs of severe 
environmental harms. 
This crime, named geocide or ecocide, literally a killing of the earth, is the 
environmental counterpart of genocide, and would be enshrined in a single 
international convention. The logic of ecocide is as follows: significantly 
harming the natural environment constitutes a breach of a duty of care, and 
this breach consists, in the least, in tortious or delictual conduct and, when 
undertaken with willfulness, recklessness, or negligence, ought to 
constitute a crime. The ability of the crime to encompass negligent or 
willfully blind conduct is particularly important. Proof of intentionality, as 
we have seen, can be difficult to establish.162 
                                                




While Drumbl recognizes that there are significant challenges to accomplishing such a goal, 
he also believes that they may be overcome and result in a stronger international 
agreement than is presently available.163 
 Drumbl considers the policy considerations of utilizing the International Criminal 
Court or beginning again with a new convention. First, he notes that “[o]ne overarching 
problem is that the International Criminal Court is principally designed to punish and to 
deter genocide and crimes against humanity per se.”164 The problem here may lead to 
environmental crimes being neglected in such a context. Next he points out that 
“[m]agistrates and judges on an International Criminal Court will likely not have expertise 
in the area of environmental law, policy, or science.”165 A new convention could alleviate 
this problem by having a full body of judicial experts dedicated to environmental crime. 
Perhaps the largest problem with relying on the International Criminal Court is that major 
international players have not acceded to the Court's jurisdiction.166 Drumbl acknowledges 
that the same may be true of a separate ecocide convention, but he presents compelling 
arguments for why the membership of such a regime may in fact be more universal. 
Essentially, he argues that the war crimes that the Rome Statute primarily covers are “hot 
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button” issues and major militarized States have thus far balked at the notion of conceding 
any sovereignty around such issues.167  
Drumbl ends his argument by reiterating concisely that “[t]he concept of ecocide 
ought not to be restricted to actual war. . . Ecocide could also apply in times of peace.”168 
In conclusion, Drumbl cites examples of intense ecological damage that is ongoing and 
likely to continue in the future and States in no uncertain terms that “The effects on the 
environment are clear: immediate destruction, an inability of ecosystem regeneration, and 
a contribution to global warming. Such conduct ought to fall within an ecocide convention 
and be sanctioned by an IEC.”169 His recommendations inspire action in much the same 
way Falk's framework for change did in the 1970s. 
Conclusions on the Genesis of Ecocide 
 
Reviewing some of the important scholarship on “ecocide” shows that the concept 
of an international convention focused on environmental crimes is not a new one. In fact, 
the idea has already gone through significant changes, most notably a shift from a focus on 
military activities to all ecologically detrimental acts.170 So, why has no progress been 
made in creating an independent convention for the crime of ecocide? Scholars recognized 
that the problem is political and will take popular and governmental support to gain 
momentum. In addition, legal scholars, political scientists, civil society leaders, and those 
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most affected by the serious threats – particularly those within indigenous communities– 
will need to advocate for themselves and generations to come. The challenges faced in this 
particular historical moment have also evolved since many of these articles have been 
written. For example, a new convention may need to take into account the growing 
number and intensity of detrimental harms attributable to climate change. Still, the core 
value of an independent, specified convention remains. What seems clear is that a 
functional legal definition of ecocide should include standards for the necessary severity 
and scope of environmental destruction. A functional definition would allow States, 
communities and individuals to be protected against wartime and peacetime activities. 
Activities carried out by international and domestic actors who contravened clearly 
defined and internationally recognized standards for basic environmental rights would be a 
part of such a definition. The following section looks at whether a proposal for an 
international environmental court might fulfill the needs presented above. 
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Chapter Four: Prospects for an IEC 
 
A New Diplomacy for a New Convention for a New Court 
 
The following is a discussion of whether an international tribunal with 
competency to hear a broad range of environmental claims – those both criminal and civil 
in subject matter and with jurisdiction over parties both public and private – might become 
a reality. Some scholars believe that such an effort is ill advised for political and legal 
reasons. Politically, the difficulty of attaining a multilateral agreement that would create 
such a court may be a futile effort. Legally, current proposals may be lacking in sufficient 
clarity and could be counterproductive for potential plaintiffs. The following discussion 
does not attempt to fully answer these criticisms. Instead, it presents one avenue for 
tackling a portion of the political question by applying “environmental diplomacy” to a 
potential convention for an international environmental court. Thereafter, particular 
proposals for an IEC are discussed, along with arguments against such an endeavor. 
Environmental Diplomacy 
 
Environmental diplomacy is a relatively new area of diplomatic relations amongst 
States. An IEC would likely stem from a multilateral treaty dealing with environmental 
rights and norms, which would demand strong environmental diplomacy. Richard 
Benedick, the U.S. ambassador who was the delegate to the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
negotiations has written that, "At least five major factors distinguish the new 
environmental diplomacy: (1) the nature of the subject matter; (2) the role of science and 
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scientists; (3) the complexity of the negotiations; (4) the unique equity issues involved; 
and (5) innovative features and approaches."171 These factors would be indispensable to 
the negotiation of an IEC convention. 
The first two of Benedick’s factors are inextricably connected to the international 
environmental law concept of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle can 
broadly be understood as a State "duty to take precautionary action and to avoid risk,"172 
when dealing with possible environmental harm. This principle has begun to solidify into 
customary international law; for example, the precautionary standards embodied within 
the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols support this development. Negotiations for an IEC 
convention would be founded on recognition of the importance of the precautionary 
principle because stakeholders would need to be convinced of the importance of 
environmental governance and the science that supports it to participate in good faith. 
The third and fourth factors Benedick lists can be placed in the context of the 
multilateral diplomacy that characterizes environmental negotiations. Diplomacy theorists 
note that multilateral diplomacy has become an increasingly important venue for State 
interaction and cooperation and was once itself called "the 'new' diplomacy.'"173 Broad 
agreement across States with disparate threats and goals would be one of the strongest 
challenges of establishing a treaty regime codifying international environmental legal 
norms. The 1992 Earth Summit provides an example of the need to bring the global 
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community together to effectively address international environmental issues. The 
resulting documents from that effort would inform a convention on legal norms pertaining 
to the environment, which dealt with a portion of the equity issues I have discussed 
above.174 
Benedick's fifth factor relies on both the strength of recognizing the precautionary 
principle and the advantages of multilateral diplomacy. Innovation in increasingly complex 
environmental diplomatic negotiations will be essential because states will likely demand 
flexible mechanisms to achieve their goals. Innovative legal approaches may likely be the 
cornerstone of an IEC convention because of the breadth of parties involved and the 
fundamental nature of the problems a comprehensive subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction treaty presents. Looking at the success of the Montreal Protocol and the 
heretofore lack of success of the Kyoto Protocol vis-à-vis the strength of each of their 
precautionary provisions and the extent of the multilateral support they were able to 
achieve is helpful in understanding what innovations may be necessary to negotiate a 
treaty that would result in an IEC. 
A. History of the Protocols 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) provided 
the framework for the Montreal Protocol (1987). The subject of the convention was the 
regulation of CFC's, which were thought to be causing depletion of the protective ozone 
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layer in the Earth's atmosphere. While the original convention facilitated 
"intergovernmental cooperation on scientific research, systematic observation of the 
ozone layer, monitoring of CFC production and the exchange of information, . . . it 
contained no commitment to take any action to reduce CFC production or 
consumption."175 Therefore, diplomacy became essential even after the guiding treaty was 
created in order to arrange an implementation agreement to which States could comply. 
Although not originating this particular style of diplomatic State cooperation, the Vienna-
Montreal model has since become the “gold standard” of environmental diplomacy 
because of the success it has achieved. 
Richard Benedick has chronicled the diplomatic success of the Montreal Protocol 
in his book Ozone Diplomacy. He attributes the successful negotiations to seven factors: 
"the indispensable role of science," "the power of knowledge and of public opinion," "the 
activities of a multilateral institution (UNEP)," the U.S.'s "policies and leadership," 
"private sector leadership," the "flexible and dynamic instrument" that was created and the 
"process [of] subdividing this complex problem into more manageable components."176 
The role of science, public opinion and UN involvement has permeated environmental 
diplomacy because of the complexity and comprehensive nature of the subject matter. In 
regard to the leadership, which Benedick splits between the U.S. and the private sector. 
For example, "U.S. support for regulating CFCs was first constrained, and later facilitated, 
by the development of CFC substitutes by Dupont Chemical Corporation, the major CFC 
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producer in the United States."177 This gave the U.S. incentive to enter into the agreement, 
especially since the European Community, the other large producer and consumer of 
CFCs, was competing well with the U.S.178 Benedick's final assessments of success are 
central to the innovative features and approaches that are characteristic of the new 
environmental diplomacy. Chief among these approaches is the idea of the protocol, or 
protocols,179 as a set of linkages to the convention, to which States may pick and choose 
adherence. One of the strengths of the protocols that are found in the Montreal agreement 
and the subsequent agreements following the Montreal round of negotiations is the almost 
universal compliance States have shown.  
A corollary to the protocol innovation in a treaty regime producing an international 
environmental court might include different “parts” within the structure of the court, 
which like the protocols, States might choose to be bound to or not. One part might be a 
criminal part and another might be a civil part – to follow the approach taken in this 
discussion, or parts could be divided along thematic environmental lines (e.g. land, water, 
air, multimedia) or other designations. The ultimate project might be to have universal 
membership for each part, which could be an ongoing political process akin to the process 
advocates for the International Criminal Court have been engaged. One might imagine that 
national politics might be able to support such adherence to different parts over the course 
of time as populations and economies in States deal with particular environmental threats. 
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However, the convention-protocol model has not been without its critics. This 
convention-protocol model has been criticized for prolonging the process of negotiations 
as well as being particularly ill fitting in its application to environmental problems. The 
convention-protocol model may rely too heavily on political consensus producing "lowest 
common denominator agreements"180 that can be common in multilateral diplomacy. This 
limitation of multilateral diplomacy may be necessary to get States to the negotiating table 
and stay there, but, "satisfying the political demands of the countries involved is not 
enough,"181 simply because of the nature of the subject matter. Another criticism of the 
process lies in the "bloating" of subsequent environmental diplomacy processes after the 
success of the Montreal process. In the decade following the Vienna-Montreal 
combination the international diplomatic process to deal with climate change attempted to 
mirror Montreal's success. However, the multilateral diplomacy conducted at Vienna was 
between 28 States while the 1992 UNFCCC was undertaken during the largest summit of 
world leaders of its time at the UN Conference on Environmental and Development 
(UNCED).182 Such "multilateral spectaculars" have been criticized for their girth and the 
problems this causes related to questions of who is to participate, how decisions will be 
made, who will set the agenda and how public the debate will become.183 Unfortunately, 
an IEC convention may need to mirror the UNFCCC in this regard. 
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Notwithstanding its scope, the UNFCCC was relatively similar to the Vienna 
Convention. However, the level of fulfillment of its final criteria is perhaps oxymoronic in 
that in some ways it attempted to be an innovative copy. Having a similarly broad 
environmental topic and dealing specifically with an atmospheric problem, the convention 
was created to mirror Vienna in providing a framework for a subsequent protocol. The 
Kyoto Protocol, modeled on Montreal, was created in order to fulfill the UNFCCC. 
There were innovations within Kyoto, but the basic model remained in tact. This reliance 
on formula can hardly be described as innovative. An IEC convention would surely need 
to learn from the successes and failures of both the Montreal and Kyoto processes. 
B. The Precautionary Principle 
First and foremost, the characteristic that distinguishes environmental diplomacy 
from other areas of diplomacy is the subject matter. The natural environment places 
constraints and responsibilities on States that are not present in economic negotiations, 
conflict diplomacy or human rights conferences. One of the primary differences in 
environmental diplomacy deals with a reliance on scientific data. However, when dealing 
with ecologies this data is not only often hard to record, it is often speculative. For this 
reason the precautionary principle has began to form in international law. Simply stated, it 
is necessary for States to avoid risk before scientific data can fully quantify that risk 
because after the harm has been done it may be irreparable. This principle's necessity is 
most acute in the forum of biodiversity wherein a lack of precautions has resulted in the 
extinction of species. This principle can also be applied to fish stock management wherein 
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species extinction carries a direct economic consequence. Even a State reluctant to engage 
in multilateral agreements such as the U.S. has led in the creation and ratification of a 
treaty providing for "a precautionary approach to fisheries management with strong 
provisions on enforcement and incentives for cooperation among countries."184 
The Vienna Convention was partly significant in that it was "probably the first 
example of the acceptance of the “precautionary principle” in a major international 
negotiation."185 The UNFCCC followed suit by including in its third article that parties, 
"should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects."186 Benedick is extremely proud of the 
achievements of the Montreal Protocol in regard to the precautionary principle, writing 
that it "contained unprecedented provisions that significantly influenced future 
environmental negotiations and that, taken together, represented a sea-change in 
international diplomacy."187 However, even though the principle did make it into the 
subsequent Kyoto Protocol there has not been the level of compliance with Kyoto as 
there was with Montreal. The Precautionary Principle is still not considered to be 
customary international law and even if this designation does become evident there are 
those that believe it does little to sway State behavior.188 
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The progression of the precautionary principle in international law can be seen in 
the various treaties and international agreements that invoke it. However, the general level 
of compliance with these invocations is low in most countries, showing that the principle 
has not entered the realm of customary international law. This can be attributed most 
bluntly to a reliance on a wait-and-see strategy or 'no regrets' policy akin to the position 
of the U.S. government in reference to climate change negotiations.189   
Arguments against the precautionary principle range from "meaninglessness" to 
bad policy. The meaningless charge stems from the contention that the principle actually 
has no application to policy decisions because it is impossible to "identify safe options . . . 
when we are profoundly ignorant of the probable outcomes."190 This argument fails to 
take into account a conception of risk assessment that underlies the precautionary 
principle. A more middling argument is exemplified in the decision of the WTO regarding 
the propriety of European Union regulations on genetically modified foods, which 
followed a precautionary principle. 191 In that case, the WTO found the EU precautionary 
principle policies to be overreaching and in conflict with WTO regulations. The WTO 
approach required a risk assessment only when there was scientific uncertainty as to 
cause and effect, magnitude or severity instead of merely insufficient scientific data. In a 
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case of the latter, EU law would have been triggered by the precautionary principle. The 
WTO decision can be read as a rebuke of the solidification of the EU-recognized 
formulation of the precautionary principle as a standard of international customary law.  
The WTO ruling specifies that there has been no authoritative decision regarding the 
principle and no definitive legal definition of the principle.192 
While the formulation of a legal definition for the “precautionary principle” could 
stem from international adjudication, a convention that establishes an IEC would likely 
include this foreseeable and potentially contentious interpretation. The climate change 
issue is currently a divisive one in national and international policies, based in some 
measure on the level to which risks must be averted through precaution by mitigation 
efforts, as opposed to adapting to conditions as they arise. The codification of a 
precautionary principle in international law in an IEC convention could alleviate some of 
this controversy.  
A precautionary principle would span the environmental considerations of 
biodiversity, management of fish stocks, natural resource management, and environmental 
commons protection. One of the fundamental necessities in environmental diplomacy is 
the codification of a precautionary principle that is sufficient to protect ecologies humans 
depend upon both for health and economic activity. As the Rome Statute codified war 
crimes based on human rights norms, an IEC convention may be able to fashion an 
accepted definition of transboundary breach that is based on international environmental 
norms, like the precautionary principle. However, adherence to those norms will require 
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universal jurisdiction (or its functional equivalent) so multilateral diplomacy regarding 
environmental governance will need to extend to all States. The involvement of States 
such as the U.S. and China that disproportionately affect and are affected by international 
environmental issues would be indispensable to such efforts. 
C. Multilateral Diplomacy 
The process of garnering cooperation between multiple States, as is needed in the 
case of climate change negotiations, are invariably complex. However, "complexity is 
indeed a problem but it is not normally fatal."193 Multilateral diplomacy has greatly 
increased in size and, "as an important mode of diplomacy multilateralism is here to 
stay."194 Part of the reason for the important role of multilateral diplomacy is the 
complexity of the world in which it exists. "By the middle of the twentieth century, the 
international arena had become too big and too complex for traditional bilateral diplomacy 
to manage."195 It is the scope of State power of the natural environment and the 
potentially global effects of environmental issues that resonate in Benedick's call for 
recognition of unique equity issues during environmental negotiations. 
As noted above, the Montreal process originally included only the 28 mostly 
industrialized States party to the Vienna Convention. However, once the Montreal 
Protocol was formulated, "the developing world moved to center stage in 1989 and 
claimed a major role in revising the protocol."196 There were stark inequities in the 
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consumption of CFC's per capita. Consumption rates of high populations countries, 
primarily China and India, were dwarfed by the consumption rates by individuals in the 
West. The economies of these countries, having developed 'late' were still in the process of 
gaining certain technologies. Curbing of the allowable production of CFC's was worrisome 
to countries that had not benefited from CFC production in the past, but might have in the 
future. To ensure that the ban on CFC's would not harm these developing nations' 
economies they wanted to have assurances that the new benign technologies that the West 
had developed would be available to them in order to compete in the global market 
place.197 In the end, developing nations, including the Chinese and Indian holdouts, ratified 
the convention protocol and subsequent amendments. Without the continued multilateral 
diplomacy that Benedick chronicles in Ozone Diplomacy, the agreements would surely 
have fallen apart. 
The application of the Montreal process is a seductive model for subsequent 
international environmental agreements. It has been an overall success in dealing with 
scientific data and furthering the precautionary principle and it is an example of effective 
utilization of multilateral diplomacy to deal with a complex and broad-impact issue. 
However, the primacy of Benedick's final component for environmental negotiations, 
while evident in the substance of Montreal's provisioning, has not translated to all 
environmental diplomacy efforts, i.e. the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The 
centrality of innovation in Montreal, both in terms of its contribution to the 
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precautionary principle and its variations on multilateral diplomacy, cannot be wholly 
transposed to Kyoto and is unlikely a direct blueprint for an IEC convention. 
D. Innovative Approaches 
The framers of the Vienna Convention did not invent the convention-protocol 
relationship. However, it was the flexibility of linkages that are inherent in this form of 
diplomacy that was improved upon by the Vienna-Montreal diplomatic process. While the 
judicial subject matter of the Rome Statute process might afford a more direct analogy on 
one level to a proposed IEC convention, the underlying environmental issues are likely 
important considerations around which diplomacy would need to be structured for an IEC 
convention. The inter-reliant connections between environmental science and policy were 
made clear in the Vienna-Montreal diplomatic process and the protocol strengthened these 
connections by providing for periodic assessments, "undertaken by an elaborate structure 
of international expert groups that interacted with the government negotiators."198 States 
have been able to opt out of the subsequent amendments to Montreal that have made 
regulation tighter and include far more compounds in its list of ozone depleting chemicals. 
An IEC convention might need to be premised on the reality that scientific consensus can 
change and that decisions of the court would necessarily be informed by current scientific 
information, which might afford review of cases as science and technology progress. 
Innovations of Montreal that dealt with the inherent complexities within global 
multilateralism was the development of a fund to assist developing countries and two 
separate voting systems, one for industrialized and one for developing countries. This 
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separate voting scheme accepted that broad consensus would not be particularly efficient 
and has facilitated cooperation. Such consideration of the strength of parties by legal 
burden shifting or composition of an arbitral panel in a judicial context might be considered 
in an IEC convention. Finally, the compliance issue in Montreal was given over to a threat 
of sanctions, however the mechanisms to avert this last resort compliance were both 
smart and strong, relying "on consultation and assistance rather than confrontation and 
penalties."199 
However, not all innovations in the environmental diplomacy context have born 
fruit and should be analyzed scrupulously to avoid similar mistakes in a new contention. 
The Kyoto Protocol had an innovation of its own beyond the model that Montreal 
presented, namely the emissions trade mechanisms built into the protocol. These 
mechanisms allowed for industrialized nations to offset their (primarily carbon) emissions 
by purchasing credits from lower or non-emitting organizations in a marketplace created 
for this purpose. The model for this system was the U.S. Clean Air Act.200 U.S. pressure 
to include this sort of market-based answer to the inequality and compliance issues is 
ironic since the U.S. did not ratify Kyoto. In addition, the refusal of the Kyoto process 
by President George W. Bush in 2001 "reinforced the view that Kyoto had to be the only 
way forward."201 Unfortunately, these market mechanisms have not produced either 
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compliance by States (most notably in the Canadian case)202 that have entered into Kyoto 
or effectively addressed developing nations increasing consumption of fossil fuels and 
consequent emissions. The lesson here would seem to be that domestic solutions to 
problems do not always translate well to international agreements. For example, legal 
solutions for structuring an international environmental court may likely learn much from 
the case of national specialized environmental courts, but an IEC would need to be 
carefully crafted to fill a unique position in the international legal landscape. 
Benedick's criteria for environmental diplomacy are a good set of indicators for 
successful environmental negotiations. However, as Benedick notes, "the signing of a 
treaty is not necessarily the decisive event in a negotiation; the process before and after 
signing is critical."203 An effort to create an IEC convention would require the further 
development of the 'new' diplomacy in that innovative, science based arguments 
underpinning the need for such a convention would need to be presented to multiple 
stakeholders within the context of judicial resolution as the prime mode for multiparty 
rewards and overall, beneficial international stability. However, much of the negotiations 
will deal with the structure and function of the court. Most of the proposals for the court 
have focused on these aspects, as discussed below. 
Proposals for an IEC 
 
In the analysis above, Mark Drumbl proposed that a new convention structured 
around ecocide might yield a new court that could adjudicate such a claim. Drumbl’s 
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discussion of the deficiency of the International Criminal Court touches on political 
considerations and international relations theory.  
Recent scholarship in the area of international relations shows that 
conventions with strict liability and rigorous enforcement measures are 
difficult to negotiate and even more difficult to enforce, especially when no 
uniform consensus exists. The trick lies in utilizing more effective and 
often gradual methods to stimulate agreement. As a result, discussions 
related to ecocide might be more effective if undertaken within the nexus of 
a framework negotiation, as had been the case in climate change, another 
urgent area of environmental concern. Instead of focusing on immediately 
creating unambiguous rules and strict liability, an attempt ought to be made 
to negotiate consensus around mutually acceptable standards that, through 
ongoing negotiations, can eventually be distilled into rules. Such 
negotiations should involve not only States, but also non-governmental 
organizations, transnational public interest advocates, trading 
organizations, and other similar groups. [T]he ecocide convention would be 
more than simply a criminal statute, but an organization designed to 
enhance awareness and to develop methods to maximize incentives not to 
engage in environmentally pernicious military initiatives in the first 
place.204 
 
Drumbl’s comments acknowledge that the type of environmental diplomacy that 
Benedick describes may be necessary to move the international community toward a 
convention establishing an adjudicatory body dedicated to protecting the global 
environmental.  
Multiple international organizations have either dedicated resources or have been 
developed specifically to press for an IEC. These include the Italian organization 
International Court for the Environmental Foundation (ICEF).205  The ICEF produced the 
first potential statute for an IEC in 1992. The British organization International Court for 
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the Environment Coalition (ICE) is also an active advocacy organization. ICE envisions a 
court that progresses from an optional forum to a mandatory one. The ICE proposes a 
court that is first an arbitral forum that would be available for submission by parties to its 
jurisdiction and once this is established the court might attain mandatory jurisdiction in 
the future.206 The thinking on this type of incremental project involves the belief that such 
a court could become a trusted, de facto forum for international environmental arbitration, 
which would lend it to the authority to gain trust of hard-to-convince international actors 
(i.e. the United States and multi-national corporations).  
Seemingly, the problem with this approach is that the political hurdle of having 
key States and their powerful economic interests submit to the authority of such a court 
may not be affected by it becoming a regular “port of call” for corporations or States who 
submit to the arbitral jurisdiction of the court. It seems unlikely that any of the pressing 
concerns that are outlined in this discussion would entail potential defendants’ submission 
to any court’s jurisdiction after a potential wrong is committed. Ultimately, it is an issue 
of the difference in international relations between voluntary or mandatory commitments. 
Environmental diplomacy is the effort to potentially gain State agreement to mandatory 
commitments. In the case of a convention that forms an IEC, the mandatory commitment 
would likely be a submission to the court’s jurisdiction. 
The issue of whether voluntary action or commitments will best serve 
environmental problems (e.g. climate change or ecocide) is an uncomplicated one for most 
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analysts of international relations. A State commitment is preferable to voluntary action 
in the concrete resolution of an international issue because of the reliance on cooperation, 
dialogue and assistance that follows respected international commitments. It is important 
to note that a State enters into a commitment voluntarily and is not obligated to do so, but 
once committed it is difficult for a State to release itself from the commitment because of 
the effect this has on subsequent international agreements. In effect, States do not want to 
develop "a reputation for breaking one’s promises."207 Commitments within the 
framework of international agreements signal to all the States in the agreement that 
compliance will be interdependent and self-enforcing within the compact between States. 
States are prompted to act by the expectation that other States will comply and their 
compliance is expected.208 There are consequences for non-compliance that can be built 
into international binding agreements, but it is the agreement itself that is the primary 
compliance mechanism. Voluntary State action, absent a multilateral agreement, has no 
such guarantees. It is important to note however, that it is the diplomatic process that 
must engage important actors in order for such an international agreement to be effective. 
Further, the ICE model of voluntary submission to jurisdiction can already be 
found at the ICJ for disputes involving States. As discussed above, the ICJ has not 
become a place where environmental disputes are regularly heard. As noted, the most 
recent environmental law case at the ICJ, the Pulp Mills Case, provides little hope for that 
forum becoming such a tribunal. It may be that the competency of the ICJ was lacking, 
                                                




since the court there decided the issue on a procedural matter instead of delving into the 
science necessary to make an in formed judgment on the merits. However, it may be that 
the inherently political structure of the ICJ, which is primarily dependent on State 
submission to its jurisdiction did not allow for a merit-based decision. Another 
international tribunal with voluntary submission to jurisdiction, even one with the 
technical competency to deal with complex environmental issues, might not provide the 
type of resolutions necessary – those which may seriously affect the economies of the 
States party to the case. A political analysis of the Pulp Mills Case finds that the 
pollution issue was subverted to allow the ICJ to dodge a potential political bullet. Time 
may well tell if an ICE-type incremental proposal might garner a new court. The efforts of 
that organization are surely inspiring on this front. However, this discussion envisions a 
court with jurisdiction similar to the ICC growing from a multi-stakeholder international 
convention. A convention that is based on compulsory jurisdiction and undertaken by 
States that are in agreement with the underlying principles of justice on which an IEC 
bases its decisions. In this way, the court is merely the manifestation of the most 
important portion of this process: the binding agreement of international norms on 
environmental law. 
An international convention for a new environmental court would likely need to be 
formed on the basis of multiple arguments addressing concerns and providing inducements 
for disparate stakeholders of environmental issues. Arguments would need to be made on 
moral (the weakest States and individuals are most threatened), economic (resource waste 
and legal irregularity are bad for business), political (resource conflicts threaten 
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sovereignty), population (for whom public health is required), and ecological (future 
biological generations must be protected) bases. As the discussion of environmental 
diplomacy shows, the need for inducements for States, business, NGO’s and individuals 
need to be clear. Threats are not enough. Positive outcomes for each of these 
constituencies are necessary. 
Multiple gatherings of international scholars have debated the need for an 
international forum with particularized environmental competencies, but none of these 
has, of yet, yielded the types of momentum necessary for an international convention. 
One such convention occurred in Rome in 1989 through the efforts of the newly formed 
ICEF. The recommendations of the group of international legal scholars in attendance 
there was clear: a new international court is needed to deal with pressing environmental 
concerns, there considered to amount to a “world ecological crisis.” Another conference 
on the subject was held in Washington, D.C. in 1999. A group of scholars also gathered in 
Johannesburg before the 2002 World Conference on Sustainable Development to discuss 
international environmental adjudication. At each of these gatherings the problems of the 
current system of international environmental governance were recognized, but little 
momentum within the United Nations or community of world leaders has been made 
toward creating a World Environmental Organization or IEC. The twentieth anniversary 
of the Rio Declaration will be honored in 2012 with a new Earth Summit. It remains to be 
seen whether organizations dedicated to an IEC will be able to levy their resources and 
gain international and key domestic momentum to bring the dream of an IEC to reality.  
Not all international scholars are convinced that an IEC would be a positive or 
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potential development. A dissenting voice in a speech from the president of the ICJ, 
Robert Jennings, in 1992 has been said to have effectively removed the idea from the 
agenda of UNCED in Rio de Janeiro.209 However, Jennings’s remarks were an argument 
for the use of the ICJ to develop international environmental law, rather than an argument 
against the idea of a separate permanent court. In fact, the remarks criticized the use of ad 
hoc tribunals for resolving international environmental disputes. Jennings’s arguments 
included potential fragmentation of the current international system, the lack of a 
necessity since existing court can or should be able to deal with environmental issues and 
a specialized environmental court would be ineffectual because international 
environmental disputes often include other areas of law. Since Jennings’s speech, 
subsequent commentators on an international environmental court have cited these 
concerns.210 In this vein, Tim Stephens laid out structural concerns for a new IEC in his 
thorough text on international environmental judicial governance.211  
Stephens posits that existing proposals are intrinsically problematic because 
proposals which include criminal and appellate jurisdiction diverge from standard domestic 
judicial frameworks and in cases where domestic frameworks are relied upon for IEC 
proposals, they do not take into account the realities of international relations. 
Additionally, Stephens believes that a specialized forum may not be the best option for 
many environmental disputes since environmental disputes are often part of more complex 
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matters that involve other areas of international law. He also wonders, as others have, 
whether the international system would become more fragmented with a separate 
environmental court.212 Stephens does not refute the need for serious environmental harm 
to be addressed judicially and does agree that the current “patchwork” of international 
environmental judicial governance is insufficient. 
The critiques of Stephens and his predecessors would be important in shaping the 
expectations for an international agreement. Both legal considerations and diplomatic 
considerations would necessarily be confronted when structuring an agreement and 
engaging in the multilateral diplomacy necessary to make an agreement effective. 
However, Stephens relied primarily on one proposal for the court and did not undertaking 
the project of evaluating what might be necessary to make an agreement diplomatically 
palatable or a proposed court functional.213 For example, a treaty regime for an 
environmental court may have to interact explicitly with other international courts, such 
as the ITLOS Tribunal and World Trade Organization arbitral mechanisms to ensure 
coverage of complex issues in the so-called fragmented world of international courts.  
What each of the negative evaluations of an international court has in common is 
their focus on a court that would undertake current jurisdictional competencies of other 
courts – those that deal with specific treaty regimes and classic transboundary disputes 
between States that are currently heard at the ICJ. Such critiques of an IEC are not 
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altogether applicable to a court envisioned to potentially handle the aforementioned 
disputes, but more importantly handle challenges arising from States and individuals that 
seek redress as described above for claims ranging from international environmental torts 
and criminal actions. For the latter, a new convention is necessary and from this 
convention a new court would need to take its place alongside the current framework of 
international adjudicatory bodies, working with them to craft a new generation of 
international environmental laws. 
The process for crafting an environmental court would be complex and would rely 
on innovation, but successful precedent for this type of effort exists in the lessons from 
the Montreal Protocol and ICC processes. Even without such precedent, if the will for a 
groundbreaking international environmental organizational plan exists then individuals, 
organizations and States will work to shape this into an agreement. Again, complexity is 
not dispositive of impossibility or desirability. Benedick’s seven factors for success might 
be a good framework for starting to envision how an IEC might fulfill the promise of a 





 The prospects for a new treaty regime that would encompass the needs presented 
in the first two sections of this discussion are not altogether apparent in current 
discussions on the needs of the international legal community. The impacts of climate 
change on marginalized communities and States may push international legal practitioners 
and decision makers to advocate for innovative strategies to provide legal redress to 
affected. Similarly, those who are subject to ecological warfare, during times of war and 
“peace,” may be increasingly represented in international media and at international 
decision-making bodies. Their potential calls for international legal mechanisms to assign 
guilt to perpetrators of willful, destructive acts may move this debate forward.  
 Political pressure from those affected most by environmental degradation and their 
allies will surely be needed to stem the tide of harms to the ecosystems that all of us 
depend upon. However, a strong international diplomatic effort will ultimately prove 
dispositive to the question of whether an international convention sufficient to deal with 
climate tort actions and ecocide might be formed. Ongoing efforts to create an IEC are 
laudable, but seem to have a long way to go to present a cohesive, viable plan to rally the 
international community around a need for such a court. However, the development of 
international environmental law heretofore and the problems currently impacting the 
international community may make this the correct “historical moment” to attempt such a 
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